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ABSTRACT
National courts have long exercised extraterritorial authority over domestic
entities whose conduct abroad is prohibited in the domestic jurisdiction. More
recently, however, national courts have begun to use disputes over domestic
patent rights as vehicles for shaping the global business arrangements of private
parties, even absent any violation of national law. This phenomenon is
particularly pronounced in the context of “fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory” (FRAND) licenses of patents that are essential to the
manufacture and sale of standardized products. This essay explores the
increasing extraterritorial effect of national judicial decisions on licenses for
standards-essential patents, including recent instances in which courts in the
U.S. and UK have sought to establish global FRAND royalty rates for parties
engaged in national patent litigation. It also examines the increasing use of the
anti-suit injunction, a powerful procedural tool that can enjoin parallel foreign
proceedings while disputes are adjudicated in a first jurisdiction. The
combination of national courts’ willingness to determine global patent licensing
rates, coupled with the rising prevalence of the anti-suit injunction, threatens to
cause a new “race to the bottom” among jurisdictions in this commercially
significant area of the law.
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INTRODUCTION
Today’s markets for technology products — from smartphones to
automobiles to pharmaceuticals — present a paradox for national dispute
resolution systems. While such markets are inherently global in nature — with
supply chains and distribution networks around the world — the power of
national courts to exercise authority over participants in these markets is, by its
very nature, confined to national borders. Despite this limitation, national courts
have, in recent years, found ways to overcome or circumvent national constraints
on their adjudicative power, generally by exercising leverage against the local
operations of multinational firms within their jurisdictions.1 As a result, local
actions have taken on extraterritorial scope, and national courts have expanded
capabilities and incentives to influence the behavior of private parties beyond
their borders.
Of course, the extraterritorial reach of national law has long been an
established feature of many legal regimes. U.S. companies, for example, may be
subject to civil and criminal penalties for bribing foreign governmental
officials,2 for doing business in Cuba,3 and for failing to report participation in
international boycotts.4 More broadly, certain conduct of domestic entities
abroad can be prosecuted under criminal,5 tax,6 and antitrust laws.7 In addition,
intellectual property law — copyright, trademark and patent — also reaches
beyond national borders in a growing list of areas including patent exhaustion,
copyright first sale, and damages for overseas sales.8 In the vast majority of these
1

Some argue that a similar trend toward extraterritorial remedies exists with regard to
national enforcement agencies, particularly in the area of competition law. See, e.g., Koren
Wong-Ervin, Warnings Against Global Patent Licensing Remedies, LAW360, (Dec. 11, 2017,
8:50 PM EST), https://www.law360.com/articles/993603/warnings-against-global-patentlicensing-remedies (collecting sources from OECD conference critiquing extraterritorial
remedies imposed by national competition law agencies in standards-related matters). While
related, agency enforcement activity is beyond the scope of this essay.
2
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2012).
3
Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996 (Helms—Burton Act),
22 U.S.C. §§ 6021-6091 (2019).
4
I.R.C. § 999 (1997).
5
Michael Farbiarz, Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction, 114 MICH. L. REV. 507, 508
(2016).
6
Robert T. Cole et al., Extraterritorial Effects of United States Tax Laws, 12 INT’L.
LAWYER 581, 582 (1978).
7
Roger P. Alford, The Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust Laws: The United States
and European Community Approaches, 33 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 6 (1992).
8
See, e.g., Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Developing a Private International Intellectual
Property Law: The Demise of Territoriality?, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 711, 743-744 (2009)
(examining European copyright and trademark cases); Amy L. Landers, U.S. Patent
Extraterritoriality within the International Context, 36 REV. LITIG. 28, 28-31 (2016)
(exploring historical and treaty perspectives); Timothy R. Holbrook, Boundaries,
Extraterritoriality, and Patent Infringement Damages, 92(4) NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1745, 1779
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cases, national courts seek to exercise extraterritorial authority over domestic
entities when the foreign conduct in question is illegal or will cause harm in the
domestic jurisdiction (e.g., bribery, price fixing, tax avoidance), or has legal
effect in the domestic jurisdiction (e.g., foreign publications invalidating
domestic patent rights and the exhaustion of domestic patent or copyright rights
through foreign sales). However, national courts have only recently begun to use
disputes over domestic patent rights as vehicles for shaping the global business
arrangements of private parties, absent any violation of national law.
The contracts in question concern the licensing of patents required to
manufacture and sell products complying with global interoperability standards
such as Wi-Fi and 3G/4G/5G wireless connectivity. Under the policies of the
trade associations in which these standards are developed — broadly known as
standards development organizations or “SDOs” — participants often agree to
license their patents to producers of standardized products on terms that are
royalty-free or, in the alternative, which bear royalties that are fair, reasonable
and non-discriminatory (“FRAND”).9 However, because the meaning of
FRAND is not widely agreed upon throughout the industry, disputes often arise
regarding royalty rates and other terms that patent holders must offer to potential
licensees.10
This essay explores the increasing extraterritorial effect of national judicial
actions in the global wireless telecommunications market — specifically the socalled “smart phone wars” and disputes over standards-essential patents. In
particular, this essay focuses on the willingness and ability of national courts to
fashion private global licensing arrangements on the basis of an alleged breach
of the patentee’s FRAND commitment and the licensee’s alleged infringement
of one or more domestic patents. This type of extraterritorial judicial contract
formation stands in stark contrast to the judicial resolution of typical
international contract disputes, in which courts determine whether or not a party
has breached its contractual obligations and, if so, what remedy — monetary or
injunctive — is warranted. Likewise, these efforts differ from judicial
interpretations of the governing law of international contracts, which, while

(2017) (discussing extraterritorial patent damages under 35 U.S.C. §§ 284, 271(a) and (f));
Sapna Kumar, Patent Damages Without Borders, 25 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 73, 105-106
(2017) (comparing patent law and the law of the sea); Marketa Trimble, The Territorial
Discrepancy between Intellectual Property Rights Infringement Claims and Remedies, 23
LEWIS & CLARK L. Rev. (2019) (discussing Canadian judicial remedy against Google’s
worldwide operations), P. Sean Morris, From Territorial to Universal—The
Extraterritoriality of Trademark Law and The Privatizing of International Law, 37 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 33 (2019) (analysing extraterritoriality under trademark law).
9
See Jorge L. Contreras, Fixing FRAND: A Pseudo-Pool Approach to Standards-Based
Patent Licensing, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 47 (2013).
10
See generally Chryssoula Pentheroudakis & Justus A. Baron, Licensing Terms of
Standard Essential Patents: A Comprehensive Analysis of Cases. JRC Science for Policy
Report EUR 28302 (2017) (cataloging FRAND litigation around the world).
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undoubtedly affecting international commercial arrangements, do not actually
create the very obligations between the parties.
With the exception of the FRAND cases discussed herein, national courts
have seldom sought to reform, or create, private contractual arrangements that
extend beyond their national borders and involve patents over which they
otherwise lack adjudicatory power. This trend presents a new and potentially
problematic species of extraterritorial authority that national courts have
asserted, both in the U.S. and abroad.
The remainder of this essay proceeds as follows: Part I discusses recent
instances in which national courts in the U.S. and UK have sought to establish
global royalty rates for parties in resolving national patent litigation. Part II
discusses the anti-suit injunction, a procedural tool increasingly invoked by
parties and employed by courts to enjoin parallel foreign proceedings in FRAND
disputes. Part III explores the possibility that these trends are leading to a global
race to the bottom among jurisdictions and a race to the courthouse among
litigants. This essay concludes with an assessment and proposed solutions.
I.

GLOBAL FRAND RATE DETERMINATIONS

Courts adjudicating FRAND royalty rates must make a choice grounded in
contradiction. On one hand, patents are established under national law and, by
definition, have legal effect only in the issuing jurisdiction.11 On the other hand,
the parties to FRAND disputes are often multinational corporations with
operations (and patents) in jurisdictions around the world. In determining a
FRAND royalty rate, a court must decide whether to focus only on the patents
issued and asserted in its own jurisdiction, or to consider the global business
relationship between the parties. In several such cases, the courts have limited
their FRAND rate determinations to the patents before them. However, a number
of courts have evidenced a willingness to specify the details of a global FRAND
license between the parties, thus covering not only their national patents, but
other patents around the world that are subject to the licensor’s FRAND
commitment. Part I of this essay briefly discusses cases adopting the traditional
approach of assessing royalties for in-country patents only, and then analyzes in
greater detail those recent cases in which courts have elected to establish global
FRAND royalty rates.
A.

National Royalty Determinations

The traditional U.S. approach to damages in patent cases is to assess a
reasonable royalty for infringing products made, used or sold. Cases involving
FRAND royalty determinations are somewhat different, as the court-assessed
royalty rates in such cases are not necessarily intended as compensatory
damages, but as the rates that the patent holder should have offered to the

11
See, e.g., Timothy R. Holbrook, Boundaries, Extraterritoriality, and Patent
Infringement Damages, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1745, 1745 (2017).
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infringer under its FRAND commitment.12 Thus, the outcome of such a
determination is often the issuance of a license by the patent holder to the
infringer, and the infringer’s payment of back royalties for the period prior to
the issuance of the license.
U.S. district courts followed this pattern in two of the first adjudicated
FRAND royalty disputes, Microsoft v. Motorola13 and Innovatio.14 In both of
these cases, which have been the subject of extensive discussion,15 the courts
analyzed only the U.S. patents before them, with little discussion of patents or
royalties in other jurisdictions.16
More recently, in Optis Wireless Tech., LLC, v. Huawei Device Co. Ltd.
(“Optis v. Huawei”),17 a case involving patents declared as essential to European
Telecommunications Standards Institute (“ETSI”)’s 4G LTE wireless
telecommunication standard, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Texas dismissed a motion by the patent holder, PanOptis,18 seeking a declaration
that its global licensing offer to Huawei complied with PanOptis’s FRAND

12

See Microsoft v. Motorola (Microsoft IV), 795 F.3d 1024, 1040 (9th Cir. 2015)
(specifically noting that the case was “not a patent law action”). See also generally Jorge L.
Contreras et al., The Effect of FRAND Commitments on Patent Remedies, in PATENT
REMEDIES AND COMPLEX PRODUCTS: TOWARD A GLOBAL CONSENSUS, Ch. 5 (C. Bradford
Biddle et al. eds., 2019) (presenting a more detailed discussion of this distinction and its
application across jurisdictions).
13
Microsoft v. Motorola (Microsoft III), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60233 (W.D. Wash.,
2013), aff’d 795 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2015).
14
In re. Innovatio IP Ventures LLC, 2013 U.S. Dist. Lexis 144061, at *49 (N.D. Ill. 2013).
15
See generally, e.g., Norman V. Siebrasse & Thomas F. Cotter, Judicially Determined
FRAND Royalties, in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF TECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION LAW:
COMPETITION, ANTITRUST, AND PATENTS, 365, 377 (Jorge L. Contreras ed., 2018). See also J.
Gregory Sidak, The Meaning of FRAND, Part I: Royalties, 9 J. COMPETITION LAW & ECON.
931, 968-88 (2013).
16
See Innovatio, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *43-44 (“[T]he court determines … that the
RAND rate to be paid to Innovatio for licensing Innovatio’s portfolio of nineteen 802.11
standard-essential patents is 9.56 cents for each Wi-Fi chip use or sold by the Manufacturers
in the United States”) (emphasis added); Microsoft III, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60233, at *80
(noting that with respect to the H.264 standard, there were over 2,500 patents declared as
essential worldwide, of which over 360 were issued in the U.S.); id. at *134 (noting that
“[b]roadcast television in the United States uses MPEG-2, not [the] H.264 [standard].”)
(emphasis added).
17
No. 2:17-cv-123-JRG-RSP, 2018 WL 476054 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 18, 2018).
18
PanOptis Patent Management LLC consists of a group of companies, including Optis
Wireless Technology, LLC and Optis Cellular Technology, LLC, all of which are whollyowned by Inception Holdings LLC. Unwired Planet, LLC and Unwired Planet International
Limited are also members of the PanOptis corporate family. See Plaintiffs’ Emergency
Motion for Antisuit Injunction and Request for Expedited Briefing at *4, Optis Wireless
Tech., LLC, v. Huawei Device Co. Ltd., No. 2:17-cv-123-JRG-RSP, 2018 WL 476054 (E.D.
Tex. Jan. 18, 2018) [hereinafter Optis Anti-Suit Motion].
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commitment.19 Instead, Judge Gilstrap instructed the jury to assess a FRAND
royalty rate only for the six U.S. patents in dispute, disregarding other patents
held by PanOptis around the world.20 In rejecting PanOptis’s request, the
magistrate judge (whose decision Judge Gilstrap adopted) reasoned that setting
a global FRAND rate would be akin to adjudicating a foreign patent
infringement claim, an action that “is almost always an abuse of discretion”.21
Nevertheless, as discussed in the following sections, many judges have not
exercised this degree of judicial restraint.
B.

Vringo v. ZTE (UK - High Court (Patents) (2014))

Vringo v. ZTE involved patents essential to the 2G, 3G, and 4G wireless
telecommunications standards developed within ETSI.22 Vringo, a patent
assertion entity, purchased a group of patents covering these standards from
Nokia, which had participated in the development of the standards.23 Vringo
acknowledged its obligation, inherited from Nokia, to license the patents on
FRAND terms.24
ZTE, a Chinese manufacturer of telecommunications infrastructure
equipment, allegedly infringed some of these patents.25 In October 2012, Vringo
brought patent infringement actions against ZTE around the world, including an
action in the UK High Court for Patents.26 The case in the High Court was

19
Order, Optis Wireless Tech., LLC, v. Huawei Device Co. Ltd., No. 2:17-cv-123-JRGRSP, 2018 WL 476054 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 18, 2018) (adopting Report and Recommendation of
Magistrate Judge Roy S. Payne) [hereinafter Optis Order]. For a discussion of other aspects
of this case, see David Long, Jury Awards Running Royalty for Willfully Infringed SEPs
subject to FRAND Commitment (Optis v. Huawei), ESSENTIAL PATENT BLOG (Aug. 31, 2018),
https://www.essentialpatentblog.com/2018/08/jury-awards-running-royalty-infringed-sepsoptis-v-huawei/ [https://perma.cc/64SY-89VD].
20
Five of the six patents asserted were declared to be essential to the ETSI standard. See
Final Jury Instructions at *6, *24, Optis Wireless Tech., LLC, v. Huawei Device Co. Ltd.,
No. 2:17-cv-123-JRG-RSP, 2018 WL 476054 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 18, 2018).
21
Memorandum Opinion, Order, and Recommendations at *2, *15, Optis Wireless Tech.,
LLC, v. Huawei Device Co. Ltd., No. 2:17-cv-123-JRG-RSP, 2018 WL 476054 (E.D. Tex.
Jan. 18, 2018).
22
Vringo, Inc. v. ZTE Corp., No. 14-cv-4988 (LAK), 2015 WL 3498634, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
June 3, 2015).
23
Id.
24
Id. See generally Marc Sandy Block, Transfers of Standards Essential Patents, in
CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF TECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION LAW: COMPETITION, ANTITRUST,
AND PATENTS, ch. 14 (Jorge L. Contreras, ed., 2018) (discussing the transferability of FRAND
commitments following a transfer of the underlying patents).
25
Vringo, 2015 WL 3498634, at *1.
26
See generally Vringo v. ZTE [2014] EWHC (Pat) 3924 (Eng.). See also David L. Cohen,
A Short History of Vringo’s Battle with ZTE, LINKEDIN (Oct. 11, 2017)
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/short-history-vringos-battle-zte-david-l-cohen/
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adjudicated by the Hon. Mr. Justice Birss who, in November 2014, found that
one of the UK patents that Vringo asserted against ZTE was both valid and
essential to the ETSI 3G and 4G standards.27 Accordingly, a full trial was
scheduled for June 2015 to consider issues of infringement and the entry of an
injunction.28 Vringo, however, moved to stay the patent trial until after a later
hearing scheduled for early 2016, in which issues surrounding Vringo’s FRAND
commitment were to be resolved.29
Vringo wished to postpone the patent trial with ZTE to first determine
whether the license that Vringo had offered to ZTE complied with Vringo’s
FRAND commitment to ETSI.30 Vringo reasoned that if the license offer was in
fact FRAND and ZTE refused it, then Vringo should automatically be entitled
to an injunction in the UK under its patent which, in 2014, was found to be valid
and essential to the ETSI standards, given that ZTE’s products clearly
implemented those standards.31
In this case, the license that Vringo offered to ZTE was a global portfolio
license covering all of Vringo’s relevant patents world-wide (presumably to
resolve the parties’ global litigation).32 Vringo argued that global portfolio
licenses are the norm in the industry, an assertion that Mr. Justice Birss
accepted.33 ZTE, however, rejected Vringo’s global licensing offer, arguing that
with respect to the action in the UK, ZTE need only obtain a license under
Vringo’s valid UK patents, and not the other patents at issue throughout the
world.34
In denying Vringo’s request to postpone the June 2015 patent trial, Mr. Justice
Birss highlighted Vringo’s insistence on offering ZTE a global license rather
than a license limited to the UK.35 He first rejected Vringo’s argument that
ZTE’s failure to accept a global license indicated that ZTE was an unwilling
infringer who should be subject to an injunction.36 He noted that:
[J]ust because it may be so that the global portfolio offer is a FRAND offer,
it does not follow that the global portfolio licence on offer is the only set of
[https://perma.cc/S7C9-D6RS] (providing an overview of the worldwide patent dispute
between Vringo and ZTE).
27
Vringo v. ZTE [2014] EWHC (Pat) 3924 [156]-[157] (Eng.).
28
Vringo v. ZTE [2015] EWHC (Pat) 214 [101] (Eng.).
29
Id. at [102].
30
Id. at [105].
31
Id.
32
Id. at [103].
33
Id. at [107].
34
Id. at [104].
35
Id. at [105]-[106], [113].
36
Id. at [105]-[107]. The European Court of Justice held in Huawei Tech. Co. v. ZTE
Corp., that a patent holder subject to a FRAND commitment may violate EU competition law
if it seeks an injunction against an infringer that is willing to accept a license on FRAND
terms. See generally C-170/13, 2015 E.C.R. 477.
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terms which could be FRAND. It seems to me that there is likely to be a
FRAND rate for [the UK patent].37
Accordingly, if Vringo had offered ZTE a FRAND license for the UK patent
alone, and ZTE rejected that license, Vringo might indeed be entitled to an
injunction.38 However, as Vringo had only offered ZTE a global license, even if
that global license were FRAND, the court could not find ZTE to be an unwilling
licensee.39 Doing so, in fact, would facilitate a form of “international coercion”
in which the threat of an injunction in the UK could be used to force a licensee
to acquire — i.e., pay for — undesired rights in other jurisdictions.40 For this
and other reasons Mr. Justice Birss rejected Vringo’s argument that its only
obligation under its FRAND commitment was to offer a global license that was
on FRAND terms.41
C.

Unwired Planet v. Huawei (UK - High Court (Patents) (2017))

In Unwired Planet v. Huawei,42 Unwired Planet, a U.S.-based patent assertion
entity,43 sued Huawei for infringement of six UK patents that it acquired from
Ericsson,44 two of which the court found essential to ETSI’s 2G, 3G and 4G

37

Vringo v. ZTE, [2015] EWHC (Pat) 214 [107] (Eng.) (emphasis added).
Id. at [109].
39
Id.
40
Id. at [108]-[109].
41
Id. at [107].
42
Unwired Planet Intl. Ltd. v. Huawei Techs. Co. Ltd. (Unwired Planet I) [2017] EWHC
(Pat) 711 (Eng.), aff’d Unwired Planet Intl. Ltd. v. Huawei Techs. Co. Ltd. (Unwired Planet
II) [2018] EWCA (Civ) 2344 (Eng.) As of this writing, leave to appeal to the UK Supreme
Court has been granted. Unwired Planet Int’l Ltd. v. Huawei Techs. (UK) Co Ltd., Order
(Sup. Ct. UK, Apr. 11, 2019), available at http://www.fosspatents.com/2019/04/supremecourt-of-uk-grants-huaweis.html). For additional discussion and analysis of this case, see
generally Jorge L. Contreras, Global Markets, Competition and FRAND Royalties: The Many
Implications of Unwired Planet v. Huawei, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Aug. 2017, at 1 [hereinafter
Contreras, Global Markets]; J. Gregory Sidak, Why Unwired Planet Might Revolutionize the
Resolution of FRAND Licensing Disputes, 3 CRITERION J. INNOVATION 601 (2018) [Sidak,
Unwired Planet]; Thomas F. Cotter, Some Thoughts on Unwired Planet v. Huawei,
COMPARATIVE
PATENT
REMEDIES
BLOG
(Apr.
17,
2017),
http://comparativepatentremedies.blogspot.com/2017/04/some-thoughts-on-unwired-planetv-huawei.html [https://perma.cc/XA2T-X8LH].
43
Unwired Planet is an affiliate of PanOptis. See Optis Anti-Suit Motion, supra note 18,
at *4. The UK litigation discussed here is part of a global patent battle waged by PanOptis
and its affiliates against Huawei in the U.S., UK, Germany, China and other countries. Id. at
*1, *3.
44
Ericsson is a Swedish telecommunications company. See About us, ERICSSON,
https://www.ericsson.com/en/about-us [https://perma.cc/L9R7-6FPJ] (last visited Apr. 6,
2019).
38
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wireless telecommunications standards.45 As Ericsson had participated in
development of the standards at ETSI, the court considered the patents to be
encumbered by Ericsson’s FRAND commitment to ETSI.46
Unwired Planet sued Huawei, among others, for infringement of these patents
in the UK and sought an injunction preventing Huawei from selling infringing
products (such as smartphones and tablets) in the UK.47 Huawei argued that it
was entitled under the terms of Unwired Planet’s (i.e., Ericsson’s) FRAND
commitment to ETSI to receive a license to practice the patents on FRAND
terms. 48 As a result, it argued that Unwired Planet’s prior licensing offers were
not FRAND and thus in violation of European competition law.49 In response,
Unwired Planet requested that the court fashion a global FRAND license
between the parties, and if Huawei did not accept the court-determined license,
to issue an injunction against Huawei’s sale of infringing products in the UK.50
Huawei responded that the UK court could not and should not enforce nonUK patent rights, and instead should determine only the relevant FRAND
royalty as to Unwired Planet’s two valid UK patents.51 Huawei further argued
that Unwired Planet’s insistence on a global license, when only two UK patents
were at issue, constituted a violation of European competition law inasmuch as
Unwired Planet sought to use its dominant position in the UK to tie unwanted
global patents to its UK patents.52
Like Vringo v. ZTE, Unwired Planet went before Mr. Justice Birss. In
Unwired Planet, however, the judge reversed his previous position regarding
global versus UK-only licensing.53 Responding favorably to Unwired Planet’s
offer of a global license, he first observed that the ETSI standards in question
are intended for use around the world, both by equipment manufacturers and by
consumers.54 Next, he noted that “the vast majority” of standards-related
45
Unwired Planet I [2017] EWHC (Pat) 711, at [1]. Unwired Planet originally brought
suit under six patents, five of which were alleged to be essential to the standards in question,
and two of which were ultimately found to be essential to those standards. Unwired Planet II
[2018] EWCA (Civ) 2344, at [6]-[7].
46
The court reached this conclusion without discussion, citing Article 6.1bis of the ETSI
IPR policy, which notes that an ETSI participant’s FRAND undertaking “should be binding
on successors in title.” Unwired Planet I [2017] EWHC (Pat) 711 at [87(i)]. See also generally
Block, supra note 24 (discussing transfer of FRAND obligations).
47
Unwired Planet I [2017] EWHC (Pat) 711, at [23(i)].
48
Id. at [23(ii)].
49
Id.
50
Id. at [23(i)].
51
Id. at [526].
52
Id. (“Huawei submitted that it is a fundamental principle of EU competition law that a
dominant undertaking cannot tie or bundle together, with a product or service in respect of
which it holds a dominant position, some other product or service which does not fall within
the same market.”).
53
See Vringo v. ZTE [2014] EWHC (Pat) 3924 [108]-[109] (Eng.).
54
Unwired Planet I [2017] EWHC (Pat) 711, at [91].
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licenses in the industry, including all of the comparable licenses introduced at
trial, were granted on a worldwide basis, with only occasional exclusions.55
He then emphasized that both Unwired Planet and Huawei were global
enterprises.56 Mr. Justice Birss thus concluded that “a licensor and licensee
acting reasonably and on a willing basis would agree on a worldwide licence.”57
He considered the prospect of two large multinational companies agreeing to
country-by-country licensing — the very arrangement that he seemingly
advocated in Vringo — to be “madness.”58 With regard to Huawei’s claim that
Unwired Planet’s insistence on a global license contradicted EU competition
law, Mr. Justice Birss again relied on the commonplace nature of worldwide
FRAND licenses to conclude that such licenses were unlikely to have
anticompetitive effects or to distort competition.59
Huawei also contended that a UK-determined worldwide license would limit
a licensee’s ability and incentive to challenge patents in other countries —
notably Germany, where Huawei was actively challenging Unwired Planet’s
patents.60 Furthermore, Huawei suggested that once the licensee committed to
pay royalties worldwide, it effectively admits the validity of the patents around
the world.61 Mr. Justice Birss rejected that argument, noting that “[a] FRAND
licence should not prevent a licensee from challenging validity or essentiality of
licensed patents and should have provisions dealing with sales in non-patent
countries” — i.e., excusing the payment of royalties in countries in which no
valid patents subsist.62
Accordingly, and in direct contradiction with his prior reasoning in Vringo,
Mr. Justice Birss held that a FRAND license can only be a worldwide license.63
Mr. Justice Birss distinguished his holding from Vringo in that the cases were
“not dealing with the same problem,” and admitted that “what seemed clear to
[in Vringo did] not seem . . . as clear cut” in Unwired Planet.64

55

See id. at [534]. Some comparable licenses, for example, excluded China. Id.
Id. at [538].
57
Id. at [543].
58
Id.
59
Unwired Planet I [2017] EWHC (Pat) 711, at [535].
60
Id. at [536], [565]-[567].
61
Id. at [536]
62
Id. at [567].
63
Id. at [572] (A “licence with a UK only scope is not FRAND.”).
64
Id. at [560]. Specifically, he expressed concern that if both a global license and a UKonly license could be FRAND, courts would not be able to pinpoint a single FRAND royalty
rate to resolve the dispute, and lamented that “if . . . both kinds of licence — UK only and
worldwide — are FRAND in the circumstances of this case then FRAND cannot be enforced
at all.” Id. at [561].
56
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The court next determined the FRAND royalty rates that Huawei should pay
to Unwired Planet on a global basis.65 The court first computed a “benchmark”
FRAND royalty rate for the patents covering each standard at issue.66 Next, the
court determined a specific royalty rate for three different groups: (1) Major
Markets; (2) Other Markets; and (3) China.67 The court held that Major Markets
were those countries in which Unwired Planet held more than two or three
patents covering at least one of the standards at issue.68 The court applied the
benchmark rate in Major Markets69 and, with little explanation, a rate equal to
50% of the benchmark rate to China and Other Markets.70
Huawei appealed the High Court’s decision on several grounds.71 However,
the Court of Appeal rejected Huawei’s arguments —affirming the High Court’s
ruling and global FRAND rate determination.72 The Court of Appeal reasoned
that the High Court’s decision did not seek to usurp any foreign court’s
determination as to patents in its own country.73 Rather, the decision related
solely to a global agreement between Huawei and Unwired Planet and thus, no
issue of comity was raised, nor was any implication created with respect to
65
See id. at [582]-[592]. A detailed discussion of the complex and painstaking royalty
calculation method followed by Mr. Justice Birss in Unwired Planet I is beyond the scope of
this essay. For more information on this matter, see, generally, Contreras, Global Markets,
supra note 42, at 8-11; Sidak, Unwired Planet, supra note 42; Siebrasse & Cotter, supra note
15, at 386-89.
66
Unwired Planet I [2017] EWHC (Pat) 711, at [586], [807(8)].
67
Id. at [587], [807(13)].
68
Id. at [587]. Major Markets included France, Germany, India, Japan, UK, U.S., Canada,
Italy, Spain, Taiwan, Ireland, Netherlands, New Zealand, Switzerland, Argentina, Australia
and South Korea. Id.
69
Id. at [587], [591].
70
Id. at [583], [589] (“The appropriate rate for China is not complicated to arrive at. The
comparable licences show that rates are often lower in China than for the rest of the world.
The relative factor varies. I find that a FRAND licence would use a factor of 50%. . . . The
rate of [Other Markets] countries would be the China rate on the basis that the products are
made in China under licence.”)
71
Huawei challenged three rulings of the lower court on appeal including: (1) the
determination of FRAND royalty rates on a global basis; (2) the imposition of a royalty rate
that substantially differed from that charged to another similarly-situated licensee, Samsung,
under the non-discrimination prong of Unwired Planet’s FRAND commitment; and (3) the
failure to require Unwired Planet to comply with the European Court of Justice’s procedural
framework established in Huawei v. ZTE, Case C-170/13, 2015 Bus L.R. 1261, before seeking
an injunction against Huawei. Unwired Planet II [2018] EWCA (Civ) 2344, at [19]-[21]. In
support of its challenges, Huawei argued that Mr. Justice Birss’s approach in Unwired Planet
I: (i)… pays insufficient heed to the principle of comity or to the appropriate limitations on
the exercise of the court’s powers in cases touching on foreign patents; (ii)…necessarily and
wrongly presumes infringement of at least some valid SEPs in territories outside the UK; and
(iii)…is contrary to public policy and disproportionate.
72
Id. at [56], [74], [81], [99], [113], [290]-[291].
73
Id. at [81].
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infringement in any jurisdiction outside the UK.74 The Court of Appeal further
dismissed Huawei’s concerns as to public policy and disproportionality,
reiterating that the High Court-fashioned license “conform[ed] in its scope to
normal practice in the industry” and that Unwired Planet had “always taken the
position that in all the circumstances a FRAND licence would be a worldwide
licence.”75 In sum, the Court of Appeal affirmed the High Court’s ruling and
allowed its global FRAND rate determination to stand.
The decision in Unwired Planet has been appealed to the UK Supreme
Court,76 but barring a reversal, other UK judges have indicated that they intend
to follow that case’s approach of adjudicating global licenses in FRAND cases.77
D.

TCL v. Ericsson (U.S. - C.D. Cal. (2017))

Similarly, TCL v. Ericsson involved Ericsson’s commitment to grant TCL, a
Chinese manufacturer of low-cost smartphones, a license for patents essential to
ETSI’s 2G, 3G, and 4G wireless standards on FRAND terms.78 Unlike Huawei
in Unwired Planet, TCL voluntarily negotiated with Ericsson for a global
portfolio license.79 Accordingly, the U.S. District Court for the Central District
of California took as a starting point the need to calculate FRAND royalty rates
for a global portfolio license,80 and was particularly sensitive to regional
variations in patent value.81 Judge Selna, in his opinion, recognized that not all
countries are created equal in terms of patent portfolio strength and that some
variation in royalty rates among countries is warranted.82 However, he went on
to make the practical observation that courts are not equipped to “resolve
disputes involving the technical nuances of patent law in dozens of
74

Id. at [80]-[81], [88].
Id. at [98], [104].
76
Unwired Planet Int’l Ltd. v. Huawei Techs. (UK) Co Ltd., Order (Sup. Ct. UK, Apr. 11,
2019), available at http://www.fosspatents.com/2019/04/supreme-court-of-uk-grantshuaweis.html.
77
See, e.g., TQ Delta, LLC v Zyxel Commc’ns UK Ltd. [2019] EWHC 353 (Pat) [25]
(Carr J). (“In relation to global licences for FRAND/RAND cases, the principles have been
very clearly set by the Court of Appeal, in particular in Lord Kitchin’s judgment in Unwired
Planet v Huawei.”)
78
TCL Comm. Tech. Holdings, Ltd. v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson, No. 8:14-cv00341, 2017 WL 6611635, at *2, *4-*6, *22 (C.D. Cal., Dec. 21, 2017).
79
Id. at *6 (“TCL and Ericsson agreed to engage in a binding court adjudication of terms
for a worldwide portfolio license.”) (emphasis added).
80
Id. at *46-*50.
81
Id. at *44-*46 (“[T]o look at patent families in the abstract without regard to where
actual patents are enforceable would result in a subsidy to consumers in countries where the
SEP owner has more enforceable patents from consumers that are not legally obligated to pay
such a royalty. In essence, a global patent rate that does not account for differences in national
patent strength provides the SEP owner a royalty based on features that are unpatented in
many jurisdictions.”).
82
Id.
75
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jurisdictions,” and that as a result, when disputes and geographic disparities are
insignificant, it is more practical for courts to use a generalized royalty structure
for global adjudications.83
After considering extensive expert testimony regarding regional differences
in Ericsson’s portfolio strength, the court divided the world into four regions:
(1) China; (2) the United States, (3) Europe, and (4) the Rest of the World
(“ROW”).84 Next, Judge Selna adjusted the FRAND royalty rate by region and
standard according to Ericsson’s portfolio strength.85 Ultimately, the court
arrived at the following comparative weighing of regional portfolio values:
Table 186
FRAND Royalty Regional Adjustments in TCL v. Ericsson
2G
3G
4G
United States
100%
100%
100%
Europe
72.2%
87.9%
n/a
China/ROW
54.9%
74.8%
69.8%
The court then spent considerable energy calculating the baseline FRAND
royalty rate using both top-down and comparable license methodologies.87 Thus,
in TCL v. Ericsson, the U.S. court determined a global FRAND royalty rate, but
in doing so gave at least some attention to national variations in patent strength
and coverage. This decision has also been appealed.
83

Id.
Id. at *45-*46.
85
Id. Judge Selna noted that he would have preferred these proportions to be expressed by
country rather than by region, but the expert testimony that was presented at trial only
specified such results by region. Id. at *45. Compare id., with Unwired Planet I [2017] EWHC
(Pat) 711, at [583] (finding, somewhat arbitrarily, a 50% reduction to the FRAND royalty in
Minor Markets and China).
86
TCL Comm. Tech. Holdings, 2017 WL 6611635, at *45.
87
See id. at *46-50. The mechanics of this analysis are beyond the scope of this essay, but
for a more detailed discussion and critique, see Jorge L. Contreras, TCL v. Ericsson: The First
Major U.S. Top-Down FRAND Royalty Decision, PATENTLY-O BLOG (Dec. 27, 2018),
https://patentlyo.com/patent/2017/12/contreras-ericsson-decision.html
[https://perma.cc/MKZ9-ZV7L]. See also Fei Deng, Gregory K. Leonard & Mario A. Lopez,
Comparative Analysis of Court-Determined FRAND Royalty Rates, 32 ANTITRUST, July 2018,
at 47-49 (comparing differing top-down methodologies in Unwired Planet v. Huawei and TCL
v. Ericsson); Peter Georg Picht, FRAND Determination in TCL v. Ericsson and Unwired
Planet v. Huawei: Same but Different?, MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR INNOVATION AND
COMPETITION RESEARCH PAPER 18-07 (2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3177975; Thomas F.
Cotter, Thoughts on the TCL v. Ericsson FRAND Decision, COMPARATIVE PATENT REMEDIES
BLOG (Jan. 2, 2018), http://comparativepatentremedies.blogspot.com/2018/01/thoughts-ontcl-v-ericsson-frand.html [https://perma.cc/8FYV-8RQK]. But see J. Gregory Sidak, Judge
Selna’s Errors in TCL v. Ericsson Concerning Apportionment, Nondiscrimination, and
Royalties Under the FRAND Contract, 4 Criterion J. Innovation 101 (2019) (criticizing
decision).
84
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Conversant v. Huawei and ZTE (UK - High Court (Patents) (2018))

Conversant is a Luxembourg patent assertion entity with principal operations
in Canada and the United States.88 It claims to hold patents that it acquired from
Nokia and that are essential to ETSI standards in 40 countries.89 For several
years, Conversant engaged in negotiations to license its global portfolio of
patents to Huawei and ZTE — both of which are Chinese mobile device
manufacturers with global operations90 and who have disputed whether any of
Conversant’s patents are valid and essential to the ETSI standards.91
As a result, litigation commenced in several jurisdictions, including in the
UK.92 Conversant petitioned the court to declare that its global license offers to
Huawei and ZTE complied with its FRAND obligations.93 Huawei and ZTE then
challenged the jurisdiction of the High Court — a challenge which was rejected
on appeal.94 As of this writing, leave to appeal to the UK Supreme Court has
been granted.95
II.

STAYING INTERNATIONAL FRAND LITIGATION WITH ANTI-SUIT
INJUNCTIONS

Anti-suit injunctions — “interlocutory remed[ies] issued by a court in one
jurisdiction to prohibit a litigant from initiating or continuing parallel litigation
in another jurisdiction” — are intended to contain litigation costs and reduce the
likelihood of inconsistent results across jurisdictions by ensuring that issues are
resolved in one jurisdiction before they are litigated elsewhere.96 While anti-suit
injunctions are available in Europe, they are primarily used in the United

88

Huawei Techs. Co. v. Conversant Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. [2019] EWCA (Civ) 38
[7] (Eng.).
89
Id. at [4], [7].
90
Id. at [7]-[10].
91
Id. at [11].
92
Id.
93
Id. at [20]-[23].
94
Id. at [112].
95
Huawei Techs. Co Ltd. v. Conversant Wireless Licensing SARL, Order (Sup. Ct. UK,
Apr. 11, 2019), available at http://www.fosspatents.com/2019/04/supreme-court-of-ukgrants-huaweis.html.
96
Jorge L. Contreras & Michael A. Eixenberger, The Anti-Suit Injunction - A
Transnational Remedy for Multi-Jurisdictional SEP Litigation, in THE CAMBRIDGE
HANDBOOK OF TECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION LAW: COMPETITION, ANTITRUST, AND PATENT
LAW 451 (Jorge L. Contreras ed., 2018). For more in depth discussion of anti-suit injunctions,
see, generally, THOMAS RAPHAEL, THE ANTI-SUIT INJUNCTION (Oxford Univ. Press, 2008)
(focusing on UK law); Richard W. Raushenbush, Antisuit Injunctions and International
Comity, 71 VA. L. REV. 1039 (1985); Alexander Shaknes, Anti-Suit and Anti-Anti-Suit
Injunctions in Multi-Jurisdictional Proceedings, 21 INTL. L. PRACTICUM 96 (2008); Daniel
Tan, Anti-Suit Injunctions and the Vexing Problem of Comity, 45 VA. J. INTL. L. 283 (2005).
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States.97 There are a number of reasons that a prospective licensee might seek
an anti-suit injunction, particularly in the context of standards. Such injunctions:
[C]an be particularly powerful tools for prospective licensees alleging that
[patent] holders have failed to comply with their FRAND licensing
commitments. Specifically, a court reviewing a [patent] holder’s
compliance with a FRAND licensing commitment may issue an anti-suit
injunction to prevent the [patent] holder from bringing foreign patent
infringement claims (including injunctions against the sale of infringing
products) until the question of licensing terms has been resolved in the
issuing jurisdiction.98
In the United States, there are some variations in the tests applied by different
courts to assess the propriety of an anti-suit injunction.99 Traditionally, however,
courts purport to follow some variant of the three-part framework developed by
the Ninth Circuit in E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Andina Licores S.A.100 Under the
Gallo framework, a court considering a request for an anti-suit injunction must
first determine whether the parties and the issues in the action in which the
injunction is sought (the local action) are functionally equivalent to those in the
action sought to be enjoined (the foreign action).101 If not, an injunction barring
the parties from pursuing the foreign action would not reduce duplicative
litigation, and would thus be unjustified. If the parties and the issues are
functionally the same, the court must also determine whether resolution of the
local action would be dispositive of the foreign action.102 Generally, a court is
unlikely to find that an anti-suit injunction is justified if the local action does not
result in the resolution of the foreign action.103 Second, the court must assess
whether any of the four factors identified by the Fifth Circuit in In re Unterweser

97

See Contreras & Eixenberger, supra note 96, at 455.
Id. at 451.
99
Tan, supra note 96, at 289 (“[In the United States, t]here are two main approaches,
neither providing a clear and workable test to guide the courts in the anti-suit injunction
inquiry.”).
100
See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc. (Microsoft II), 696 F.3d 872, 881 (9th Cir.
2012) (examining the three-part inquiry established in E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Andina Licores
S.A., 446 F.3d 984, 991 (9th Cir. 2006)).
101
Applied Med. Distrib. Corp. v. Surgical Co., 587 F.3d 909, 915 (9th Cir. 2009).
Functionally equivalent parties can include parties that are members of the same corporate
family, even if based in different jurisdictions. See, e.g., APR Energy, LLC v. First Inv. Group
Corp., 88 F.Supp.3d 1300, 1319 (M.D. Fla. 2015) (finding parent and subsidiary corporations
to be “effectively the same” for anti-suit injunction proceedings). Functional similarity of
issues depends upon whether “all the issues in the foreign action can be resolved in the local
action.” Microsoft II, 696 F.3d at 882-83. The issues “need not be ‘precisely and verbally
identical,’ as ‘the verbal form of laws in different countries will inevitably differ.’” Id. at 883;
see also Applied Med., 587 F.3d at 915.
102
Microsoft II, 696 F.3d at 881.
103
See id. at 888-89.
98
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Reederei104 are present. These factors include whether the foreign litigation
would “(1) frustrate a policy of the forum issuing the injunction; (2) be vexatious
or oppressive; (3) threaten the issuing court’s in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction;
or (4) prejudice other equitable considerations.”105 Any of the four factors may
justify the entry of an anti-suit injunction.106 Finally, if at least one of these
factors is present, the court must ask whether the injunction will have a
significant impact on international comity.107
In addition to applying the Gallo analysis to assess the propriety of an antisuit injunction, the U.S. district court in Microsoft v. Motorola considered the
traditional four-factor analysis for preliminary injunctive relief.108 However, on
appeal, the Ninth Circuit essentially eliminated this extra step.109
As noted above, U.S. courts vary in their specific analyses of anti-suit
injunctions. Below is a summary of the principal anti-suit injunction decisions
relating to FRAND disputes both in the U.S. and the UK.
A.

Microsoft v. Motorola (U.S. - W.D. Wash. (2012))

In Microsoft v. Motorola (Microsoft I),Microsoft alleged that Motorola
breached its commitment to offer Microsoft a patent license on FRAND110 terms
in violation of the policies of two SDOs, the International Telecommunications

104

In re Unterweser Reederei GMBH, 428 F.2d 888, 890 (5th Cir. 1970), aff’d on reh’g,
446 F.2d 907 (5th Cir. 1971), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. M/S Bremen v. Zapata OffShore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
105
Id.
106
Gallo, 446 F.3d at 990 (“[I]f any of the four elements is present, an anti-suit injunction
may be proper.”).
107
Id. at 991 (“[W]e may rely on any of the Unterweser factors if it applies to the case and
if the impact on comity is tolerable.”).
Comity is the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative,
executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty
and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens, or of other persons who are under
the protection of its laws.
Id. at 994 (quoting Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895)).
108
Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc. (Microsoft I), 871 F. Supp. 2d 1089, 1097 (W.D.
Wash. 2012), aff’d, Microsoft II, 696 F.3d 872 (9th Cir. 2012).
109
“Ordinarily, we do not assess at all the likelihood of success on the merits in a case like
this, because when a preliminary injunction is also a foreign anti-suit injunction, the
likelihood-of-success aspect of the traditional preliminary injunction test is replaced by the
Gallo test.” Microsoft II, 696 F.3d at 883-84. See Order Granting Samsung’s Mot. for Antisuit
Injunction at 7-8, Huawei Techs., Co., v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No 3:16-cv-02787-WHO (N.D.
Cal. Apr. 13, 2018) (citing and following Microsoft II).
110
The SDO policies at issue in Microsoft v. Motorola required the licensing of patents on
“reasonable and non-discriminatory” terms (RAND). See Microsoft I, 871 F.3d at 1093.
However, for consistency of discussion, these are referred to as FRAND herein.
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Union (ITU) and the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE).111
When negotiations over the FRAND license requested by Microsoft broke
down, Microsoft brought a breach of contract claim against Motorola in the U.S.
District Court for the Western District of Washington.112 Six months later,
Motorola sued Microsoft for patent infringement in Germany.113 The German
court, finding infringement, enjoined Microsoft from selling infringing Xbox
and laptop computer products in Germany.114 In response, Microsoft sought an
anti-suit injunction from the federal district court in Washington to prevent
Motorola from enforcing the German injunction.115
Given that the two actions involved the same parties, the court first considered
whether the issues in the U.S. and German cases were effectively the same.116
Even though the suits technically involved different causes of action — breach
of contract in the U.S. and patent infringement in Germany — the court
determined that the resolution of the U.S. matter would be dispositive of the
German matter.117 The court reasoned that if Motorola were found in the U.S. to
have breached its FRAND obligation to the relevant SDOs, then Motorola would
not be entitled to seek injunctive relief against Microsoft in any jurisdiction,
including Germany.118
Next, the district court asked whether “‘continuation of the foreign litigation
would frustrate a policy of the forum issuing the injunction.’ . . [Including]
policies against avoiding inconsistent judgments, forum shopping and engaging
in duplicative and vexatious litigation.”119 Given that the issue of injunctive
relief was before both courts, the district court considered the possibility of
inconsistent judgments.120 Further, the district court noted that Motorola’s
various litigation tactics frustrated the court’s ability to properly adjudicate the

111

This dispute was related to two industry standards utilized in Microsoft’s XBox and
laptop computer products: ITU’s H.264 advanced video coding standard and IEEE’s 802.11
Wi-Fi standard. See id. at 1093-95.
112
Id. at 1089.
113
Id. at 1096
114
Id.
115
Id.
116
Id. at 1098 (“Here the parties admit that for purposes of an anti-suit injunction the
parties are the same.”).
117
Id. at 1099-100.
118
Id. In making this determination, it was particularly relevant that Motorola’s
commitment to ITU required that it grant Microsoft a worldwide license under all of
Motorola’s relevant patents, including those asserted in the German case. See id. at 1096.
119
Id. at 1100 (citing Applied Med. Distrib. Corp. v. Surgical Co., 587 F.3d 909, 918 (9th
Cir. 2009)).
120
See id.
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issues before it.121 Thus, this prong of the analysis also supported the grant of an
anti-suit injunction.122
Finally, the court considered the potential impact of the proposed injunction
on international comity, noting that the “[e]xtension of comity to a foreign
judgment is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere
courtesy and good will, upon the other.”123 In this case, the court found that
comity concerns should not prevent the entry of an anti-suit injunction as
Motorola did not initiate its German action until six months after Microsoft
brought an action in Washington.124 Moreover, the court found that the suit was
primarily a U.S. dispute lacking significant foreign issues and thus suggested
that permitting the German injunction to stand could itself harm international
comity.125 Next, the court found that the traditional analysis for preliminary
injunctive relief also weighed in favor of granting the injunction.126 As a result,
the district court entered the anti-suit injunction against Motorola.127
On appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Motorola argued
that Microsoft’s U.S. contract action would not necessarily resolve the German
infringement action.128 Specifically, the breach of contract claim focused on
whether Motorola must offer FRAND terms in its initial royalty offer, rather
than only in the ultimate license, and whether Motorola’s initial royalty offer to
Microsoft constituted a breach of Motorola’s FRAND commitment to ITU.129
As such, Motorola argued, the resolution of the U.S. action would not be
dispositive the German action, and concerns of vexatious litigation and prejudice
would not be implicated.130
Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s issuance of the
anti-suit injunction.131 Citing the terms of Motorola’s commitment to ITU, the
court reasoned that “the face of the contract makes clear that it encompasses not
just U.S. patents, but all of Motorola’s standard-essential patents worldwide.”132
Therefore, regardless of how the FRAND royalty was ultimately calculated,
Motorola’s contractual commitment was incompatible with seeking an
injunction barring Microsoft’s sales in Germany.133

121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1101 (quoting Asvesta v. Petroutsas, 580 F.3d 1000, 1010-11 (9th Cir. 2009)).
Id,
Id. (relying on Applied Med. Distribution, 587 F.3d at 921).
Id. at 1102-03.
Id. at 1103-1104.
Microsoft II, 696 F.3d at 883.
Id. at 879.
Id. at 885-86.
Id. at 889.
Id. at 884.
Id. at 885.
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Vringo v. ZTE (U.S. — S.D.N.Y. (2015))

Vringo v. ZTE involved a multi-jurisdictional dispute over patents essential to
ETSI’s 2G, 3G, and 4G wireless telecommunications standards.134 Following
the commencement of litigation, the parties began settlement discussions and
entered into a mutual non-disclosure agreement (NDA).135 Once negotiations
deteriorated, ZTE filed an antitrust action in Shenzhen, China, claiming that
Vringo’s failure to grant ZTE a patent license on FRAND terms constituted an
abuse of its market position.136 In order to support its claim, ZTE presented
information that had been exchanged between the parties during the time that
the NDA was in place.137 In response, Vringo brought a breach of contract action
in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York and sought an
anti-suit injunction “[requiring] ZTE to withdraw its Shenzhen complaint and
[enjoining] it from pursuing the same or similar claims in that court.”138
The U.S. court declined to issue the requested anti-suit injunction, reasoning
that the applicable threshold criteria had not been satisfied.139 Although the
parties to the two suits were the same, the court noted “[a] decision holding that
ZTE breached the NDA would not necessarily foreclose the antitrust action in
the Shenzhen court.”140 Specifically, “[t]he fact that ‘ZTE use[d] Vringo’s
highly confidential opening offer as the basis for its claims that the offer
constitutes an abuse of power’ does not foreclose the possibility that ZTE
provided or will provide the Shenzhen court with other evidence and reasons
from which it could conclude that Vringo abused its market position.”141
Accordingly, the court rejected Vringo’s motion for an anti-suit injunction.142
C.

TCL v. Ericsson (U.S. — C.D. Cal. (2015))

TCL v. Ericsson involved patents required to implement ETSI’s 2G, 3G and
4G wireless telecommunications standards.143 TCL filed a contract claim against
Ericsson in the United States District Court for the Central District of California
“alleging that Ericsson breached its obligation to license [the patents at issue] to
TCL on FRAND terms.”144 TCL also sought an anti-suit injunction to prevent
134

Vringo, Inc. v. ZTE Corp., No. 14-cv-4988(LAK) 2015 WL 3498634, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
June 3, 2015). See also supra Part I.B.
135
Id. at *3.
136
Id. at *6.
137
Id. at *7-*8.
138
Id. at *11.
139
Id.
140
Id.
141
Id.
142
Id.
143
TCL Commc’n Tech. Holdings v. Telefonaktienbolaget LM Ericsson, No. 8:14-cv00341-JVS-AN, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191512, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Jun. 29, 2015). See also
supra Part I.C.
144
Id. at *4.
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Ericsson from maintaining patent infringement actions against it under
corresponding patents in France, Brazil, Russia, the UK, Argentina and
Germany.145
In considering whether to grant TCL’s anti-suit injunction, Judge Selna
recognized that the parties were the same in both the California and the foreign
actions.146 Then, however, he dispensed with the remainder of the analysis,
concluding instead that both parties “indicated their desire that this action should
result in a ‘global resolution’ of the SEP patent licensing and damages
claims.”147 Given the mutual desire to reach such a shared agreement, the court
summarily granted TCL’s request for an anti-suit injunction without further
discussion.148
D.

Apple v. Qualcomm (U.S. — S.D. Cal. (2017))

In 2017, Apple sued Qualcomm in the District Court for the Southern District
of California, alleging sixty-three separate causes of action relating, among other
things, to Qualcomm’s licensing practices for patents essential to ETSI’s 3G and
4G standards.149 Shortly thereafter, Apple filed eleven additional actions against
Qualcomm in the UK, Japan, China and Taiwan, each making similar
allegations.150 In response, Qualcomm sought an anti-suit injunction seeking to
enjoin the foreign actions. Qualcomm argued that the foreign actions constituted
“part of a single licensing dispute already before [the California] court” and were
thus duplicative.151
The court disagreed, distinguishing the case from Microsoft v. Motorola,
which Qualcomm relied heavily upon.152 According to the court, the U.S.
contractual dispute in Microsoft pertained to Motorola’s alleged breach of its
FRAND obligation to two SDOs.153 If decided adversely to Motorola, that
dispute would prevent Motorola from pursuing its infringement action against
Microsoft in Germany.154 In this case, however, it was Qualcomm, not Apple,
that owed an obligation to the SDO.155As the court explained, “Apple, unlike
145
See id. at *10-14. TCL also requested an anti-suit injunction against actions brought by
Ericsson in the Eastern District of Texas. Id. at *2, *10-*11. Since these involved different
patents and issues than the foreign actions, the anti-suit injunction was denied by the court
with respect to the Texas actions. Id. at *15-*16.
146
Id. at *17.
147
Id. at *18.
148
Id. at *19.
149
Order Denying Anti-Suit Injunction, at 5-6, Apple Inc, v. Qualcomm Inc., No. 3:17-cv00108-GPC-MDD, (S.D. Cal., Sep. 7, 2017).
150
Id. at 8.
151
Id. at 10.
152
Id. at 17-18.
153
Id.
154
Id.
155
Id. at 19.
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Motorola and Qualcomm, has made no binding commitment that limits the relief
that it may seek or how it may enforce that relief.”156 Thus, the court concluded
that Qualcomm “failed to demonstrate that the issues in Apple’s U.S. and foreign
actions [were] functionally similar in the sense that an adjudication [of the
claims] on the merits [before the U.S. court] would dispose of [Apple’s foreign
antitrust, infringement or other claims].”157 Likewise, the court found that none
of the Unterweser factors applied in this case.158 Despite Qualcomm’s
protestations to the contrary, Apple’s foreign suits could be considered neither
vexatious nor oppressive, as they were not unduly delayed or duplicative, and
because Apple had a reasonable interest in challenging Qualcomm’s patents
jurisdiction by jurisdiction.159
In addition, Qualcomm argued that allowing the foreign actions to proceed
could require it to adjust its behavior by territory “to comply with potentially
inconsistent rulings.”160 However, the court observed that Qualcomm had
already been subject to multiple rulings regarding its anticompetitive conduct in
countries including China, Korea, Japan and Taiwan,161 and had admitted to
modifying its licensing practices to conform to those rulings country by
country.162 Finally, the court found that enjoining Apple’s foreign actions
“would effectively deprive the relevant foreign courts of [their] jurisdiction to
consider whether [Qualcomm’s licensing agreements] have anticompetitive
effects” within their jurisdictions — a result intolerable to international
comity.163 Accordingly, the court denied Qualcomm’s request for an anti-suit
injunction.164
E.

Conversant v. Huawei and ZTE (UK — High Court (Chancery) (2018))

In this UK case, Conversant owned four UK patents alleged to be essential to
the implementation of ETSI mobile telecommunication standards.165 Conversant
commenced a patent infringement suit against Huawei and ZTE, both Chinese
manufacturers in July 2017,166 requesting that the UK court determine FRAND
terms for a license of its global portfolio of patents covering the ETSI
standards.167 Concurrently, ZTE brought an action in the Shenzhen Intermediate
156

Id.
Id. at 22.
158
Id. at 23.
159
See id. at 23-26.
160
Id. at 29.
161
Id.
162
Id.
163
Id. at 33-34.
164
Id. at 34.
165
Conversant Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. v. Huawei Techs. Co. Ltd. & Ors [2018]
EWHC (Pat) 808 [7] (Eng.).
166
Id. at [4], [7].
167
Id. at [7].
157
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People’s Court in China requesting a determination of the FRAND royalty rate
for Conversant’s Chinese patents and a declaration that Conversant’s prior
licensing offers violated its FRAND commitments.168 In addition, ZTE “sought
an injunction restraining Conversant from ‘unfair, unreasonable, discriminatory
overpricing and other acts which are in violation of the FRAND principle,’”
including continuation of the English proceedings, and a finding of liability
against Conversant for such acts.169
In response, Conversant alleged in the UK that ZTE’s pleadings in the
Shenzhen case “directly attacked, and sought relief in respect of, the proceedings
before the English court . . . and sought to block and frustrate the English
[p]roceedings.”170 Accordingly, Conversant requested an anti-suit injunction
barring ZTE from prosecuting its conflicting claims in Shenzhen.171 Soon
thereafter, ZTE amended its Shenzhen complaint “to remove all claims for
liability that might involve . . . damages or other financial relief . . . other than
in relation to the FRAND royalty rate and FRAND licence terms for
[Conversant’s] Chinese [p]atents.”172
The court explained that the English test for granting an anti-suit injunction
depended on whether the foreign claims “were vexatious, in that they sought to
obstruct, or could have had the effect of obstructing, pending proceedings before
the English court; or of undermining or frustrating the performance of a
judgment given by the English court.”173 The court noted that, under the English
test, the elements that ZTE had recently deleted from its Shenzhen complaint
would have given rise to an anti-suit injunction.174 However, in view of the
amended complaint, no such injunction was required.175
On appeal, the Court of Appeal, though not addressing the Chancery
Division’s anti-suit injunction ruling, rejected Huawei’s and ZTE’s forum non
conveniens challenge to the jurisdiction of the English courts to establish global
FRAND rates.176

168

Conversant Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. v. Huawei Techs. Co. Ltd. & Ors [2018]
EWHC (Ch) 2549 [10]-[12] (Eng.).
169
Id. at [12(ii)], [12(v)].
170
Id. at [11].
171
Id.
172
Id. at [18].
173
Id. at [24] (citing Airbus v Patel [1999] 1 AC 119 [133]-[140] (Eng.); Aerospatiale v
Lee Kui Jak [1987] AC 871 [892]-[897] (Eng.)).
174
Id.
175
Id.
176
Huawei Techs. Co. Ltd. & Ors v. Conversant Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. [2019]
EWCA (Civ) 38 [127] (Eng.).
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Optis v. Huawei (U.S. — E.D. Tex. (2018))

In Optis v. Huawei,177 PanOptis (an affiliate of Unwired Planet) brought suit
against Huawei in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas for
the infringement of six U.S. patents that PanOptis obtained from Ericsson and
Panasonic.178 In addition to denying infringement, Huawei asserted that
PanOptis breached its FRAND commitment to ETSI (which it inherited from
Ericsson and Panasonic) with respect to five of the asserted patents that were
allegedly essential to ETSI’s 4G LTE standard.179 Shortly thereafter, Huawei
brought suit against PanOptis in the Shenzhen Intermediate People’s Court in
China, alleging breach of contract and antitrust violations.180 In the Shenzhen
action, Huawei asked the court to set the FRAND royalty rate for PanOptis’s
Chinese patents and to order that PanOptis cease all civil infringement actions
against Huawei.181 In response, PanOptis filed a motion in the Eastern District
of Texas seeking an anti-suit injunction preventing Huawei from continuing its
Chinese actions.182
In support of its motion, PanOptis first argued that the Chinese court’s
injunction, if issued, would interfere with the jurisdiction of the Texas court.183
However, the District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s report and rejected
that argument based on Huawei’s written representation that it would not seek
such an injunction.184 Next, PanOptis argued that Huawei’s Chinese actions
were “duplicitous [sic]” of the Texas actions and therefore “vexatious and/or
oppressive”.185 The court rejected these arguments as well, noting that:
177

See supra Part I.C.
Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint for Patent Infringement at 3, 6, 8, Optis Wireless
Tech., LLC v. Huawei Techs. Co. Ltd., No. 2:17-Cv-123-JRG-RSP (E.D. Tex. Apr. 14, 2017)
[hereinafter Optis Complaint]. PanOptis and the other plaintiffs in this case are affiliates of
Unwired Planet. Optis Anti-Suit Motion, supra note 18, at 4. However, the U.S. patents
asserted in this action were not part of the global license fashioned by the UK court in Unwired
Planet v. Huawei. See supra Part I.C.
179
Defendants Huawei Device USA Inc., and Huawei Device Co., Ltd.’s Amended
Answer to Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint for Patent Infringement at 32-33, Optis
Wireless Tech., LLC v. Huawei Techs. Co. Ltd., No. 2:17-Cv-00123-JRG-RSP (E.D. Tex.
Sept. 15, 2017) [hereinafter Huawei Answer to Optis].
180
Optis Anti-Suit Motion, supra note 18, at 3.
181
Id. at 3-4.
182
Id. at 1.
183
Id at 7.
184
Report and Recommendation at 1, 3, Optis Wireless Tech., LLC v. Huawei Techs. Co.
Ltd, No. 2:17-Cv-00123-JRG-RSP (E.D. Tex. Apr. 24, 2018) [hereinafter Optis Magistrate’s
Report on Anti-Suit Injunction] adopted by Order, Optis Wireless Tech., LLC v. Huawei
Techs. Co. Ltd, No. 2:17-Cv-00123-JRG-RSP (E.D. Tex. May 14, 2018) [hereinafter Order
Denying Optis Anti-Suit Injunction].
185
Optis Anti-Suit Motion, supra note 18, at 8-9. In its Motion, PanOptis conflates some
of the Unterweser factors with precursor elements of the test for the grant of anti-suit
injunctions. See id. at 7-10. For example, it treats the duplication (incorrectly characterized
178
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the Chinese actions only relate to Chinese patents. Thus, although there
may be similar factual disputes about PanOptis’s global offer, and whether
that offer complied with its FRAND obligations, the scope of any relief
awarded by this court or the Chinese court extends only as far as
jurisdiction allows. There is nothing obviously vexatious or oppressive in
allowing the lawsuits to proceed simultaneously, nor would any relief
awarded by either court overlap with relief awarded by the other.186
Accordingly, the court denied PanOptis’s motion for an anti-suit
injunction.187
G.

Huawei v. Samsung (U.S. — N.D. Cal. (2018))

Unlike several of the cases discussed above (Unwired Planet v. Huawei, Optis
v. Huawei), in this case Huawei held patents that it claimed were essential to
ETSI’s 3G and 4G wireless standards.188 In 2011, Huawei and Samsung began
to negotiate a cross-license of their respective patents.189 After failing to reach
an agreement for several years, Huawei brought suit against Samsung in the
Northern District of California, alleging that Samsung’s products infringed
eleven patents allegedly essential to the ETSI standards.190 At the same time (or
at most one day later, given time zone differences), Huawei filed suit against
Samsung in the Shenzhen Intermediate People’s Court in China.191 Samsung
answered and filed counterclaims in both the Northern District of California and
Shenzhen.192
On January 11, 2018, the Shenzhen court found that Samsung infringed two
of Huawei’s Chinese patents (both counterparts of patents asserted in the U.S.
action), that Huawei had complied with its FRAND commitments to ETSI, that
Samsung did not comply with its own FRAND commitments and was largely
responsible for the six-year delay in negotiations.193 Accordingly, the Shenzhen
court issued an injunction prohibiting Samsung from manufacturing and selling

by PanOptis as duplicity) of issues under the “vexatious” prong of the Unterweser test, rather
than as an initial requirement for such an injunction. See id.
186
Optis Magistrate’s Report on Anti-Suit Injunction, supra note 184, at 2. Since none of
the Unterweser factors were present, the court did not address PanOptis’s arguments
regarding comity. See id.
187
Order Denying Optis Anti-Suit Injunction, supra note 184.
188
Compare Order Granting Samsung’s Motion for Antisuit Injunction at 1, Huawei
Techs., Co, Ltd v. Samsung Elecs. Co, Ltd., No 3:16-cv-02787-WHO (N.D. Cal., Apr. 13,
2018) [hereinafter Order Granting Samsung’s Motion for Antisuit Injunction] with Huawei
Answer to Opti, supra note 179, at 32-33 and Optis Anti-Suit Motion, supra note 18, at 1.
189
Order Granting Samsung’s Motion for Antisuit Injunction, supra note 188, at 3.
190
Id.
191
Id. at 4 n.5 and accompanying text.
192
Id. at 3-4.
193
Id. at 5.
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smartphones with 4G LTE functionality in China.194 Samsung appealed the
Chinese ruling on January 26, 2018 and, on February 1, filed a motion in the
Northern District of California to enjoin Huawei from enforcing the Chinese
injunction.195
In analyzing Samsung’s motion for an anti-suit injunction, Judge Orrick in
the Northern District of California first considered the similarity of the actions
before the courts in the U.S. and China.196 He agreed with Huawei’s contention
that the positions of the parties were reversed from that in Microsoft v. Motorola,
in which an anti-suit injunction was granted, and on which Samsung relied.197
That is, in Microsoft, the German court granted Motorola an injunction against
Microsoft without determining whether or not Motorola had complied with its
FRAND Commitment (a question before the U.S. court in Washington).198
However, in this case, “the Shenzhen court issued injunctive relief because it
found that Samsung had not complied with its FRAND obligations.”199 Thus,
the cases before the U.S. and Chinese courts differed significantly.200
Nevertheless, Judge Orrick found these differences “irrelevant” to the more
important question: whether the local action would dispose of the foreign
action.201 As both actions asked whether the other party breached its FRAND
commitment to ETSI, the U.S. court’s answer to this question would, indeed,
dispose of the Chinese action.202
Next, after considering the Unterweser factors, Judge Orrick found that
allowing the Chinese action to continue would undermine the U.S. court’s
“ability to determine the propriety of injunctive relief in the first instance.”203
Further, he considered that the Chinese injunction posed a significant
commercial risk to Samsung, “not just in China, but with impacts percolating
around the world”.204 As such, the Shenzhen injunction would “interfere with
‘equitable considerations’ by compromising the court’s ability to reach a just
result in the case before it free of external pressure on [Samsung] to enter into a

194

Id.
Id. For a detailed discussion of Judge Orrick’s decision in this case, see David Long,
Judge Orrick Enjoins Huawei from Enforcing Injunction for Infringing SEPs Issued by
China’s Shenzhen Court (Huawei v. Samsung), ESSENTIAL PAT. BLOG (Apr. 17, 2018)
https://www.essentialpatentblog.com/2018/04/judge-orrick-enjoins-huawei-enforcinginjunction-infringing-seps-issued-chinas-shenzhen-court-huawei-v-samsung/
[https://perma.cc/6D9P-SDDQ].
196
See Order Granting Samsung’s Motion for Antisuit Injunction, supra note 188, at 5.
197
Id. at 11-12.
198
See id. at 12.
199
Id. (emphasis in original).
200
Id.
201
Id. at 13.
202
Id.
203
Id. at 17.
204
Id.
195
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‘holdup’ settlement before the litigation is complete.”205 Accordingly, he found
that the integrity of the U.S. action would “be lessened without an anti-suit
injunction”.206 Finally, Judge Orrick found that the limited scope of the proposed
anti-suit injunction (a single order relating to two Chinese patents) and its limited
duration (it would likely be less than six months until the U.S. court determined
whether Samsung had breached its FRAND commitment) would present a
“negligible” impact on international comity.207
Thus, for the above reasons, the court granted Samsung’s motion to enjoin
Huawei from enforcing the Shenzhen orders.208
H.

(FR)Anti-Suit Injunctions — Trends and Analysis

As discussed above, courts that consider anti-suit injunctions in cases
involving FRAND licensing disputes apply a variety of analytical tests and
frameworks.209 Nevertheless, there are a number of common criteria that courts
use in such cases, which are summarized in Table 2 below.
Table 2
Summary of Selected FRAND Anti-Suit Injunction Decisions
(d)
(a)
(b)
(c)
Juris.
Violates
Same
Local
Vexatious
involved
Comity or
Issues
Disposition Behavior
Policy
U.S.,
No
Yes
Yes
No
Germany

Inj.
Granted

Vringo v.
ZTE

U.S., China

No

No

No

n/a

No

TCL v.
Ericsson

U.S., France,
Brazil,
Russia, UK,
Germany,
Argentina

n/a

Yes

n/a

n/a

Yes

Apple v.
Qualcomm

U.S., UK,
Japan, China,
Taiwan

No

No

No

Yes

No

Case
Microsoft
v. Motorola

205

Yes

Id. (quoting Microsoft II, 696 F.3d 872, 886 (9th Cir. 2012)).
Id. at 17. Samsung also alleged that Huawei’s behaviour in bringing the Chinese actions
was vexatious and oppressive, but the court did not agree. Id. at 19.
207
Id. at 20.
208
Id. at 21.
209
See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
206
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Juris.
involved

(a)
Same
Issues

(b)
Local
Disposition

(c)
Vexatious
Behavior

Conversant
v. Huawei
and ZTE

UK, China

Yes

Yes

No

(d)
Violates
Comity or
Policy
n/a

Optis v.
Huawei

U.S., China

No

No

No

n/a

No

Huawei v.
Samsung

U.S., China

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

Case

Inj.
Granted
Yes210

NOTE: “n/a” signifies that an issue was not discussed by the court in its reported
decision.
Table 2 consolidates the four major issues that courts adjudicating a request
for an anti-suit injunction have considered in the FRAND cases discussed above
(after satisfying the threshold condition that the local and foreign actions involve
the same parties): (a) whether the local action involves essentially the same
issues as the foreign action, (b) whether the local action will dispose of the issues
in the foreign action, (c) whether the applicant for the injunction engaged in
vexatious or other bad faith conduct in bringing or maintaining the foreign
action(s), and (d) whether entry of the injunction would adversely impact
international comity or policies of the local forum.211
As the outcomes summarized in Table 2 demonstrate, there is essentially one
“deciding” factor that appears to predict whether an anti-suit injunction will
issue: whether the local action will be dispositive of the foreign action. The U.S.
court’s determination that its decision would dispose of the German action in
Microsoft I led to the entry of an anti-suit injunction, even though the issues
before the two courts were not identical.212 In TCL v. Ericsson, the court
considered only the parties’ apparent agreement that the U.S. action would
dispose of the foreign actions in granting an anti-suit injunction.213 Finally, the
U.S. courts’ decisions in Vringo v. ZTE, Apple v. Qualcomm and Optis v. Huawei
— that the local action would not fully dispose of the foreign actions — led to
the denial of the requested anti-suit injunctions.214 However, Huawei v. Samsung
provides the clearest indication that the dispositive effect of the local action is
210

An injunction would have been issued but for ZTE’s pre-emptive amendment of its
foreign claims. Conversant Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. v. Huawei Techs. Co. Ltd. & Ors
[2018] EWHC (Ch) 2549 [33] (Eng.).
211
See generally supra Part II.
212
See supra Part II.A.
213
See supra Part II.D.
214
See supra Part II §§ B, D, F.
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the predominant factor leading to issuance of an anti-suit injunction.215 There,
the U.S. court held that the “undeniable and important differences” between the
claims before the U.S. and Chinese courts were “irrelevant” to the overriding
question of whether the resolution of the U.S. action would resolve the Chinese
action.216
The applicant’s vexatious behavior, though supporting the Microsoft I court’s
entry of an anti-suit injunction, was not found necessary to satisfy the conditions
for an injunction in Conversant or Huawei v. Samsung. In both of those cases
the court found that an injunction was proper despite the fact that the party
bringing the foreign action had not engaged in vexatious behavior. While the
effect of an anti-suit injunction on international comity and local policy played
a minor role in Microsoft I, Apple v. Qualcomm and Huawei v. Samsung, this
factor was not addressed in the other cases.
Thus, at least in the context of FRAND suits litigated over the past few years,
the principal question to be answered when determining whether an anti-suit
injunction will issue is whether or not the local action will be dispositive of the
foreign actions sought to be enjoined. The effective reduction of the analysis to
this single factor threatens to broaden greatly the availability of anti-suit
injunctions in the future.
III. THE ROYALTY-SETTING RACE
A.

International Coercion?

As described in Parts I and II, courts in the U.S. and UK have become more
capable of and willing to fashion global portfolio licenses between parties in
order to resolve FRAND disputes. However, if courts in the UK and U.S. can
set global royalty rates for standards-essential patents, then what of courts in
Germany, France, Canada, India, Korea, Japan, China and a host of other
countries?217 As a practical matter, any sophisticated court exercising
jurisdiction over the parties can establish a global royalty rate for them.218 If the
potential licensee refuses to enter into the global license fashioned by the court,

215

See supra Part II.G.
See Order Granting Samsung’s Motion for Antisuit Injunction, supra note 188, at 13.
217
This “me too” attitude is reflected in Unwired Planet I by Mr. Justice Birss, who noted
that “courts all over the world have now set FRAND rates. I am sure the English court can do
that as well.” Unwired Planet I [2017] EWHC (Pat) 711 [169] (Eng.).
218
See Jorge L. Contreras, Global Rate-Setting: A Solution for Standards-Essential
Patents?, 94 WASH. L. REV. 701, 724 (2019) [hereinafter Contreras, Global Rate-Setting]
(“[A] court in any jurisdiction that has the parties before it can establish a global royalty rate
for them. And if the licensee refuses to enter into the global license fashioned by the court,
the licensee risks being enjoined from selling products in that country.”).
216
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it risks being enjoined from selling products in that country.219 This is what the
UK High Court identified in Vringo v. ZTE as “international coercion.”220
Thus, in Unwired Planet I, Huawei could have refused to accept the UK
court’s global license, but if it did so, it would have been enjoined from selling
products in the lucrative UK market — a sacrifice of approximately one billion
pounds per year.221 This is a Hobson’s Choice for any sizable product
manufacturer: either accept a national court’s determination of global FRAND
royalty rates or risk losing access to that jurisdiction’s national market.
Furthermore, once the parties enter into a global license, there is little reason for
courts in other jurisdictions to calculate either global FRAND rates or even
FRAND rates for patents in their own jurisdictions. Thus, the first court to set a
FRAND royalty rate for a particular set of parties will likely be the only one that
will actually do so.222
B.

Race to the Bottom

The intra-jurisdictional competition that is likely to emerge from the coercive
situation described above can lead to two forms of legal “race”.223 First is a “race
to the bottom” among jurisdictions — a well-documented phenomenon that has
arisen across diverse areas of the law. For example, U.S. states such as Delaware
have adopted rules streamlining the processes for incorporating entities and
minimizing the potential liability of corporate directors,224 countries such as
Liberia and Panama have created lax frameworks for the registration of maritime
vessels,225 and U.S. states such as Nevada and Arizona have adopted regulations
seeking to promote the testing of autonomous vehicles on their roads.226
219

Vringo v. ZTE [2015] EWHC (Pat) 214 [109] (Eng.).
Id.
221
Personal notes of Jorge L. Contreras, Professor of Law, University of Utah College of
Law, taken during observation of the oral argument in Unwired Planet II [2018] EWCA (Civ)
2344 (May 22, 2018) (on file with author).
222
Aside from the jurisdictional “races” discussed in Parts B and C below, one might also
question whether a court sitting in one country should even be deemed competent to set
royalties for patents in other countries. While parties may, and do, voluntarily agree to global
licenses, it is another thing for a court to assume authority to do this against the will of (at
least one of) the parties. If nothing else, this is a somewhat presumptuous assumption of
authority by the court setting the global rate.
223
See Contreras, Global Markets, supra note 42, at 13.
224
See, e.g., Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Democracy and Delaware: The Mysterious Race to
the Bottom/Top, 23 YALE L. & POLICY REV. 381 (2005) (discussing adjustment of corporate
law in Delaware).
225
See Allan I. Mendelsohn, Flags of Convenience: Maritime and Aviation, 79 J. AIR L.
& COMMERCE 151, 152-53 (2014) (contending that the ability of local jurisdictions to set their
own maritime rules led to “a determined and successful race to the bottom”). See also, Kumar,
supra note 8 (analogizing rules regarding maritime flags to intellectual property litigation).
226
See, e.g., Mirada A. Schreurs & Sibyl D. Steuwer, Autonomous Driving — Political,
Legal, Social, and Sustainability Dimensions, AUTONOMES FAHREN 151, 162-63 (M. Maurer
220
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Jurisdictional competition also exists among tribunals within the same legal
framework, as demonstrated by the successful efforts of the U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas to adapt its procedural rules in a manner
favorable to plaintiffs in patent litigation.227
In each of these cases, the stringency of applicable procedural rules and
substantive regulations has been relaxed or diluted. There are several reasons
why courts, regulatory authorities and legislative bodies may engage in such
races to the bottom. First, they may genuinely feel that their rules and
procedures are objectively superior to those of other jurisdictions, whether in
terms of fairness, efficiency or competency.228 Second, they may feel that the
rules of other jurisdictions have not treated their own citizens (whether
individuals or corporations) fairly, and may enact rules that will better serve
justice, at least for parties hailing from their jurisdiction.229 Finally, they may
adjust their rules in order to attract business to their jurisdiction, often at the
expense of consumer protection, worker rights, and product safety.230
et al. eds., 2015) (pointing out manufacturer-friendly rules in states such as Nevada); Timothy
B. Lee, The Way We Regulate Self-Driving Cars is Broken—Here’s How to Fix It, ARS
TECHNICA (Apr. 10, 2018), https://arstechnica.com/cars/2018/04/the-way-we-regulate-selfdriving-cars-is-broken-heres-how-to-fix-it/ [https://perma.cc/UX6F-RKXH] (describing lax
safety rules for autonomous vehicle testing in early-adopter states).
227
See, e.g., J. Jonas Anderson, Reining in a ‘Renegade’ Court: TC Heartland and the
Eastern District of Texas, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1569, 1571 (2018) (noting disproportionate
share of patent litigation brought in Eastern District of Texas); Brian J. Love & James Yoon,
Predictably Expensive: A Critical Look at Patent Litigation in the Eastern District of Texas,
20 STANFORD TECH. L. REV. 1, 3-4, 6 (2017) (analyzing quantity of patent litigation brought
in different federal district courts). The de facto dominance of the Eastern District of Texas
in U.S. patent litigation may have come to an end following the Supreme Court’s 2017
decision in TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017)
(tightening minimum jurisdictional contact requirements for bringing suit). See Anderson,
supra, at 1571 (“The case struck a direct blow against what Justice Scalia famously referred
to as the ‘renegade jurisdiction’”).
228
See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight to New York: An Empirical
Study of Choice of Law and Choice of Forum Clauses in Publicly-Held Companies’
Contracts, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1475, 1480 (2009) (arguing that parties gravitate to courts in
states such as New York and Delaware due to legitimate factors such as “their high degree of
competence and for the integrity of the state’s judiciary”).
229
See Morris, supra note 8, at 34 (“Even if one legal system prevails in the resolution of
a conflict, the losing party will feel unsatisfied and can institute measures to make its own
system applicable to other territories if it finds that its citizens or corporations have not been
treated fairly. The prevailing wisdom is that, despite the pluralistic nature of the global legal
order, certain territories’ laws are more supreme, and justice can only be achieved using those
supreme laws.”)
230
See, e.g., Greenwood, supra note 224 (discussing the view that Delaware adjusted its
corporate law to attract business incorporations); Schreurs & Steuwer, supra note 226, at 16263 (noting that according to Nevada Governor Brian Sandoval, “Nevada is the first state in
the country . . . [adopting] regulations for this vehicle . . . [and] it is important for Nevada to
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Likewise, the tendency of courts in particular jurisdictions to determine high
global FRAND rates or otherwise favor the positions of patent holders could
attract patent holders to those jurisdictions.231 As one prominent English law
firm suggests, the pro-patent Court of Appeal’s Unwired Planet judgments232
“make clear that the English courts are an attractive venue for SEP owners to
initiate FRAND litigation against companies with which they are struggling to
agree [on] licence terms.”233 By the same token, jurisdictions that establish
reputations for setting low global FRAND rates, or which are otherwise hostile
to patent holders’ claims, may attract manufacturers seeking to challenge the
rates that those patent holders offer.234
When jurisdictions intentionally adapt their rules and procedures, not to
mention their substantive decisions, to attract litigants, a race to the bottom may
emerge in which legal rules are progressively diluted in an effort to attract
litigation to the jurisdiction.235 Given the disparities in treatment of the same
issues by courts around the world, there is evidence that such forum shopping in
the area of patent litigation already occurs and that this trend is only likely to
continue.236 For example, a prominent international law firm advises that
“[c]ompetitors looking for a good place to challenge patents will be interested
in courts with a low patentee win rate.” 237 To that end, the same firm observes
that the Patent Court in London is an “excellent” venue for invalidating a patent,

be first on this.”); Lee, supra note 226 (“[C]ompetition to attract self-driving car companies
has led to a race to the bottom in state safety rules”); Anderson, supra note 227, at 1571 (“For
many years, the judges in the Eastern District have encouraged patent plaintiffs to file their
cases in the district”).
231
See, e.g., Michael Elmer & Stacy Lewis, Where to Win: Patent-Friendly Courts
Revealed, 2010 MANAGING INTELL. PROP. 34, 40, 44 (2010).
232
Unwired Planet II [2018] EWCA (Civ) 2344 (Eng.); Unwired Planet I [2017] EWHC
(Pat) 711 (Eng.).
233
Matthew Hunt & Pat Treacy, The Unwired Patent Appeal and Future Issues,
COMPETITION LAW INSIGHT (Dec. 18, 2018), reprinted in BRISTOWS (Jan. 30, 2019)
https://www.bristows.com/news-and-publications/articles/the-unwired-planet-appeal-andfuture-issues/ [https://perma.cc/T25F-E8UQ]. See also Michael Burdon, Britannia Rules on
SEPs
–
But
is
it
FRAND?
IPKAT
BLOG,
Feb.
21,
2019,
http://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2019/02/britannia-rules-on-seps-but-is-it-frand.html (“It seems
that the balance in the UK has settled very much in the SEP owner’s favour”).
234
See Elmer & Lewis, supra note 231, at 36. India could be such a jurisdiction, as might
China. Id. at 38.
235
See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, A Simple Approach to Setting Reasonable
Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1135, 1163-64 (2013)
(“[C]ompetition between jurisdictions . . . creates comity concerns” as well as other issues).
236
See id.
237
See, e.g., Elmer & Lewis, supra note 231, at 36 (discussing, inter alia, Finnegan’s
Global IP Project). See generally Stefan Bechtold, Jens Frankenreiter & Daniel Klerman,
Forum Selling Abroad, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (2019) (observing jurisdictional jockeying among
German courts).

1. CONTRERAS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

THE NEW EXTRATERRITORIALITY

10/9/19 12:07 PM

283

that “Germany has a reputation for being patentee friendly,” and that litigants
are well-advised to consider these factors when deciding where to commence
suit.238 In fact, some commentators have argued that United States courts and
agencies should better accommodate the litigation positions of particular parties
(e.g., patent holders) to avoid losing out in this jurisdictional race to the
bottom.239
C.

Race to the Courthouse

This jurisdictional race to the bottom will, by design, result in particular
jurisdictions’ rules favoring one party or another in litigation. It is likely to
encourage a party to initiate litigation in the most favorable jurisdiction possible,
as quickly as possible, often to foreclose a later suit in a less favorable
jurisdiction. This situation is referred to as a “race to the courthouse,”240 and
may prematurely drive parties to litigation rather than negotiation or settlement.
Far from being a mere theoretical possibility, such races are not only observed,
but actively encouraged, by law firms that represent clients in multijurisdictional patent litigation.241 Take, for example, one such firm’s
recommendation that its clients adopt a “first strike strategy” by initiating patent
litigation in the most favorable jurisdiction based on data compiled from about
thirty different national judicial venues.242
Scholars have also identified numerous procedural and substantive
differences among U.S. jurisdictions that have driven forum selection decisions

238

Elmer & Lewis, supra note 231, at 36-37.
See, e.g., J. Gregory Sidak, Memorandum: Will the International Trade Commission or
the Antitrust Division Set Policy on Monopoly and Innovation? 3 CRITERION J. INNOVATION
701, 711 (2018) (“As the quality of administrative adjudication deteriorates at the ITC, patent
holders engaged in global disputes over licensing or infringement can choose to litigate their
multijurisdictional disputes before highly sophisticated tribunals in other countries”);
Matthew Bultman, Patent Owners Taking Global View in Enforcement Efforts, LAW360
https://www.law360.com/articles/1064658/patent-owners-taking-global-view-inenforcement-efforts (July 18, 2018) (quoting former Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit Randall Rader as saying “The more the U.S. system is out of harmony
with international standards, the more your international corporations will prefer to litigate
elsewhere”).
240
See Peter E. Herzog, Brussels and Lugano, Should You Race to the Courthouse or Race
for a Judgment? 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 379, 379 (1995); Mark A. Lemley, Where to File Your
Patent Case, 38 AIPLA Q.J. 401, 402 (2010) (citations omitted) (“Forum shopping is alive
and well in patent law. . . . [P]atent plaintiffs . . . spend a great deal of time and effort worrying
about where to file their case. Meanwhile, accused infringers play much the same game,
looking for defense-favorable jurisdictions in which to file declaratory judgment actions. The
result in many cases is a race to the courthouse.”).
241
See Elmer & Lewis, supra note 231, at 34-36
242
See id.
239
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and the impetus to file quickly in those jurisdictions.243 And even though courts
criticize such jurisdictional races as “disorderly” attempts at “procedural
fencing,”244 most courts (at least in U.S. patent cases) typically defer to the
choice of forum made by the first party to file, further encouraging parties to
engage in such races to the courthouse.245
In response to the UK High Court’s fashioning of a global patent license for
the parties in Unwired Planet I, on appeal Huawei raised the specter of such an
international race to the courthouse.246 That is, if national courts are empowered
to establish global royalty rates and other terms for private FRAND licenses, a
veritable parade of horribles could ensue:
[I]mplementers may be faced with the threat of injunctions which
effectively deprive them of their ability to defend their FRAND positions
before the courts of the territories where the relevant SEPs subsist; courts
will set rates for [patents] over which they have no jurisdiction; the
judgment of a single court in a jurisdiction in which an implementer does
not wish to litigate may create a res judicata as between it and the [patent]
owner in relation to the terms of a global licence, and this might be very
unfair.247
However, the Court of Appeal rejected these arguments, finding “nothing
unfair” about allowing “a court in one country [to] decide, as between the
parties, whether a global or multi-territorial licence is FRAND.”248 In particular,
the court held that a single court’s determination of a global license “does not
deprive a licensee from challenging the validity and essentiality of [patents] in
any [other] jurisdiction where it may choose to do so.”249 Thus, even if a global
license is rendered by a national court, a licensee may challenge its patents in
other jurisdictions. But to what avail? As noted in Part I.B, once parties sign a

243

See Lemley, supra note 240, at 402-03. See also generally, Chester S. Chuang,
Offensive Venue: The Curious Use of Declaratory Judgment to Forum Shop in Patent
Litigation, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1065 (2012); Robert T. Sherwin, Shoot First, Litigate
Later: Declaratory Judgment Actions, Procedural Fencing, and Itchy Trigger Fingers, 70
OKLA. L. REV. 793 (2018).
244
See, e.g., Hanes Corp. v. Millard, 531 F.2d 585, 591 n.4, 593 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
(discussed in Sherwin, supra note 243, at 797).
245
See, e.g., Genentech, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 998 F.2d 931, 937 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“the
forum of the first filed case is favored, unless considerations of judicial and litigant economy,
and the just and effective disposition of disputes, require otherwise.”).
246
Unwired Planet II [2018] EWCA (Civ) 2344 [101] (Eng.).
247
Id. However, Huawei’s argument is somewhat ironic, given that the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of California in Huawei v. Samsung observed that Huawei’s own
initiation of legal actions against Samsung in Shenzhen, China (Huawei’s home city)
“implicate[ed] concerns of forum shopping”. Order Granting Samsung’s Motion for Antisuit
Injunction, supra note 188, at 18.
248
Unwired II [2018] EWCA (Civ) 2344 [104].
249
Id.
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global license, challenging patent validity in one country or another becomes far
less rewarding except in the rare case that all of a party’s patents in a particular
country are invalidated.250
The Court of Appeal went on to describe the practical difficulties that patent
holders could face if national courts were not empowered to set global royalty
rates:
On the assumption that only a country by country approach to licensing is
FRAND, a patentee in the position of [Unwired Planet] would face not just
the needless expense of negotiating and managing licenses on a country by
country basis but also the problem of dealing with a potential licensee
which is holding-out and refusing to engage in a reasonable way with the
negotiation process. The patentee must then bring proceedings country by
country to secure the payment of the royalties to which it is entitled. But
unlike a normal patent action, where an unsuccessful defendant faces the
prospect of an injunction, the reluctant licensee would know that, on the
assumption it could only be required to take licences country by country,
there would be no prospect of any effective injunctive relief being granted
against it provided it agreed to pay the royalties in respect of its activities
in any particular country once those activities had been found to infringe.251
Accordingly, the Court of Appeal in Unwired Planet II found that the burdens
of a global license did not outweigh its practical benefits or make it inappropriate
for a UK court to determine.252 In sum, the courts that have considered this issue
250
Traditionally, large standards-essential patents holders have held a broad portfolio of
patents, conferring rights in many major jurisdictions, making it unlikely that all of the patent
holder’s patents in any given country would ever be invalidated. TIM POHLMANN & KNUT
BLIND, IPLYTICS GMBH, LANDSCAPING STUDY ON STANDARD ESSENTIAL PATENTS (SEPS) 3,
27
(2016),
http://ec.europa.eu/DocsRoom/documents/20741/attachments/1/translations/en/renditions/na
tive [https://perma.cc/8N9Q-DZDK]. In recent years, however, large patent holders have
increasingly transferred their patents to patent assertion entities (PAEs), such as Unwired
Planet, Vringo, Conversant, PanOptis, St. Lawrence, Innovatio, Wi-LAN, etc., for
enforcement. This practice is referred to as “privateering”. See, e.g., D. DANIEL SOKOL,
PATENT ASSERTION ENTITIES AND COMPETITION POLICY 72 (D. Daniel Sokol ed., 2017); see
also Jorge L. Contreras, Aggregated Royalties for Top-Down FRAND Determinations:
Revisiting ‘Joint Negotiation’, 62 ANTITRUST BULL. 690, 694 (2017) (“An increasing number
of operating companies that were or are active in standards development appear to be
transferring some or all of their SEPs to patent assertion entities (PAEs) for enforcement”).
As a result, PAEs now hold relatively small numbers of patents, and the invalidation of all of
a particular PAE’s patents in a particular jurisdiction may not be a remote possibility.
251
Unwired II [2018] EWCA (Civ) 2344 at [111].
252
Id. at [113]. Interestingly, the court’s reasoning in Unwired Planet II assumes that
licensees who “hold out” and refuse to enter into license agreements on FRAND terms will
suffer no penalty save for having to pay the otherwise FRAND royalty rate years later - once
the patent holder eventually prevails in each relevant jurisdiction. See id. at [5]-[6], [57].
However, this is not necessarily the case, particularly in jurisdictions like the U.S. where

1. CONTRERAS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

286

10/9/19 12:07 PM

B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L.

[Vol. 25:2

appear to be comfortable with, or at least not opposed to, the prospect of a
jurisdictional race to the bottom coupled with a litigant race to the courthouse.
D.

The Finish Line?

In the context of multinational patent licensing, both the jurisdictional race to
the bottom and the litigant race to the courthouse have already begun. As shown
above, courts’ increasing willingness to compete in and facilitate these races,
coupled with the liberalization in application of the anti-suit injunction,253 belie
a trend that is not likely to reverse of its own accord. In the end, it may simply
be that forum shopping and races to the bottom are inevitable consequences of
unregulated multinational marketplaces in which global disputes are litigated in
national forums.
Nevertheless, litigation and jurisdictional races are costly for markets and
market participants. They distort the processes and motivations behind judicial
and administrative rulemaking — substituting national desires to attract business
for just and evenhanded application of the law. Moreover, they incentivize
litigation “first strikes” when negotiation or compromise might be more
appropriate and efficient. Accordingly, such races would ideally be eliminated
in this increasingly important and internationalized commercial realm. As
observed by one English practitioner, “The problem is only going to get more
complex and more important … As well as moving into the next generation of
telecom standards, the world is increasingly dealing with the connected world
and the Internet of Things … involving a wide range of industries including
telecoms, tech providers, automotive and broadcasting.”254
In response to this situation, several commentators, including the author,
viewing litigation and judicial dispute resolution as inherently inefficient, costly
and compromised,255 have proposed a range of private ordering solutions to
resolve or forestall disputes involving standard-essential patents and FRAND
licensing. These proposals have included mandatory “ex ante” rate

penalties for bad faith behavior, including wilful patent infringement, exist. See generally
Contreras, et al., supra note 12, at 293 (discussing enhanced damages against potential
licensees who strategically refuse to enter into FRAND license agreements). Thus, penalties
could be another measure on which jurisdictions compete with one another: those that
penalize holdout behavior may more attractive to patent holders, while those that do not may
be more attractive to potential licensees.
253
As noted in Part II G, the only reliable test for whether or not such an injunction will
issue appears to be whether or not the action in the enjoining court will be dispositive of
actions in the courts that are sought to be enjoined.
254
Burdon, supra note 233.
255
See, e.g., Stanley M. Besen, Why Royalties for Standard Essential Patents Should Not
Be Set by the Courts, 15 CHI.-KENT J. INTEL. PROP. 19 (2016) (arguing that courts are
undesirable adjudicators of FRAND disputes).
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disclosures,256 collective rate agreements,257 expedited bilateral arbitration,258
global rate-setting tribunals,259 patent pooling structures,260 and more.261
Yet, there are reasons to hold out hope for judicial resolution of these disputes.
Despite all of their challenges, judicial decisions carry with them an institutional
legitimacy that may be difficult to replicate through private means.262 While
there is no general international treaty relating to jurisdiction or recognition of
national judgments,263 such treaties exist on a regional basis, most notably within

256

See, e.g., Pierre Régibeau, Raphaël De Coninck & Hans Zenger, Transparency,
Predictability, and Efficiency of SSO-based Standardization and SEP Licensing: A Report for
the
European
Commission,
at
28-31
(June
2016)
https://www.crai.com/sites/default/files/publications/Transparency_predictability_efficiency
.pdf
http://ec.europa.eu/DocsRoom/documents/20506/attachments/1/translations/en/renditions/pd
f [https://perma.cc/DQQ6-8FHG]. See generally Jorge L. Contreras, Technical Standards and
Ex Ante Disclosure: Results and Analysis of an Empirical Study, 53 JURIMETRICS 163 (2013)
(describing ex ante rate disclosure policies adopted and proposed at several SDOs).
257
See, e.g., Luke McDonagh & Enrico Bonadio, Standard Essential Patents and the
Internet
of
Things,
at
30
(Jan.
2019)
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2019/608854/IPOL_IDA(2019)6088
54_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/SU75-5NDA] (asserting that EU institutions should allow SDO
participants to negotiate collectively for SEP royalty rates); Contreras, Aggregated, supra note
250, at 690, 692, 694, 700-01, 709 (calling on antitrust authorities to recognize that SDO
collective rate-setting should be permitted and encouraged). See generally Contreras, Fixing
FRAND, supra note 9, at 78-84 (proposing mechanism for collective SDO negotiation of
FRAND royalty rates); Besen, supra note 255 (arguing that SDOs, rather than courts, are bestequipped to make FRAND royalty determinations).
258
See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 235, at 1135, 1141 (proposing that FRAND rate
disputes be resolved through mandatory best offer arbitration).
259
See generally Contreras, Global Rate-Setting, supra note 218 (proposing global, nongovernmental rate-setting to determine FRAND rates).
260
See Microsoft IV, 795 F.3d at 1042-1045 (describing licensing pools for H.264 and WiFi patents); Besen, supra note 255, at 32-34; McDonagh & Bonadio, supra note 257, at 30;
Régibeau et al., supra note 256, at 31.
261
See, e.g., Kai-Uwe Kühn, Fiona Scott Morton & Howard Shelanski, Standard Setting
Organizations Can Help Solve the Standard Essential Patents Licensing Problem, CPI
ANTITRUST CHRON., Mar. 2013, at 3-4; Mark Lemley, Ten Things to do About Patent Holdup
of Standards (and One Not to), 48 B.C. L. REV. 149, 161-67 (2007); Marc Rysman & Timothy
Simcoe, A NAASTy Alternative to RAND Pricing Commitments, 35 TELECOM. POLICY 1010
(2011).
262
See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration,
the Private in Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804 (2014) (arguing that
private arbitration agreements, particularly those arising from consumer contracts of
adhesion, lack procedural and constitutional legitimacy).
263
See,
e.g.,
Enforcement
of
Judgments,
U.S.
DEPT.
OF
STATE,
https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/legal/travel-legal-considerations/internl-judicialasst/Enforcement-of-Judges.html [https://perma.cc/FES6-KVFZ] (last visited Apr. 14, 2019)
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the European Union.264 Moreover, treaty instruments covering limited aspects
of international jurisdiction exist, including the 2005 Hague Choice of Court
Agreements Convention, which validates forum selection clauses in certain
types of private international agreements.265 Even without broadly-applicable
treaty mechanisms, a number of international devices are available to facilitate
the coordination of litigation across jurisdictions. For example, statutory
mechanisms exist within the U.S. and EU to specify and limit the types of
damages that parties may seek in national courts in private international antitrust
cases.266
Other efforts are under way to develop instruments for the greater
coordination of international jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments,
including a Draft Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments, which is currently being negotiated at The Hague Conference on
Private International Law.267 While the Hague Convention, if adopted, could
offer international rules pertaining to jurisdictional issues, so-called “soft law”
instruments have also been proposed in this area.268 For example, specific to
intellectual property law, the American Law Institute has developed a set of
Principles Governing Jurisdiction, Choice of Law, and Judgments in
Transnational Disputes based on earlier work by Professors Rochelle Dreyfuss
and Jane Ginsburg.269 Further, with respect to anti-suit injunctions specifically,

(“There is no bilateral treaty or multilateral convention in force between the United States and
any other country on reciprocal recognition and enforcement of judgments”).
264
See, e.g., Council Directive 2004/48/EC, 2004 O.J. (L 195) 16-19.
265
Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements art. 3, June 30, 2005, 44 I.L.M.
1294,
https://assets.hcch.net/docs/510bc238-7318-47ed-9ed5-e0972510d98b.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A9UY-SEZ3].
266
See generally James L McGinnis, Oliver Heinisch, & Nadezdha Nikonova, The Rapidly
Changing Landscape of Private Global Antitrust Litigation: Increasingly Serious
Implications for U.S. Practitioners, 25 COMPETITION 1 (2016).
267
Request for Comments and Notice of Public Meeting on a Preliminary Draft
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Currently Being
Negotiated at The Hague Conference on Private International Law, 81 Fed. Reg. 81741-44
(Nov. 18, 2016). See also The Judgments Project, HAGUE CONF. ON PRIVATE INT’L. LAW,
https://www.hcch.net/en/projects/legislative-projects/judgments
[https://perma.cc/F6EXLGSY] (describing recent activity regarding the aforementioned draft Convention).
268
“Soft law” refers to legal principles embodied in guidelines, norms or agreements that
generally lack the binding force of law, but guide behavior in any event. See Daniel Thürer,
Soft
Law,
MAX
PLANCK
ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF
PUB.
INT’L
L.,
http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1469
[https://perma.cc/49FL-BZZ7] (last visited Apr. 14, 2019).
269
See generally INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES GOVERNING JURISDICTION, CHOICE
OF LAW, AND JUDGMENTS IN TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTES (AM. LAW. INST. 2008). See also
Rochelle Dreyfuss, The ALI Principles on Transnational Intellectual Property Disputes: Why
Invite Conflicts?, 30 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 819, 820-26 (2005); Dinwoodie, supra note 8, at 72021 (discussing genesis and history of ALI Principles).
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Professor Tom Cotter has proposed the development of more consistent “best
practices” that could be adopted by courts adjudicating these cases.270
Perhaps the most effective solution to the jurisdictional disharmony illustrated
by this essay would be the enactment of a single, global patent system.271 Such
a system would eliminate the ability of a court sitting in one country to decide
patent royalties for patents issued in many other countries, as a single, global
patent could cover the entire world. While the prospect of a global patent system
resonates with increasingly global product and service markets in which national
borders seem to have less and less relevance, from a practical standpoint there
appears to be little chance of such a system emerging in the foreseeable future.272
While the respective futures of these various efforts are uncertain, they at least
demonstrate that the private international law community recognizes the
necessity of improved legal mechanisms to avoid the unproductive litigation
races described in this essay.
CONCLUSION
This essay shows that, even absent any violation of national law, national
courts have begun to use disputes over domestic patent rights as vehicles for
shaping the global business arrangements of private parties. This tendency is
particularly pronounced in disputes over standards-essential patents and the
FRAND terms on which they are licensed. Aided by tools such as the anti-suit
injunction and injunctions preventing local sales of infringing products, courts
in the U.S., UK and elsewhere have increasingly sought to define such global

270

Thomas Cotter, Upcoming Talks on Extraterritoriality and Patent Remedies, COMP.
PAT.
BLOG
(Jan.
31,
2019),
http://comparativepatentremedies.blogspot.com/2019/01/upcoming-talks-onextraterritoriality.html [https://perma.cc/SF4E-MLMQ] (suggesting that courts should limit
“antisuit injunctions, in the [FRAND] context, to cases in which enforcement in another
jurisdiction would frustrate the domestic court’s ability to render judgment”).
271
See, e.g., Q. Todd Dickinson, The Long-Term International View of Patents and
Trademarks, in 4 INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW & POLICY 14-1 - 14-2 (Hugh
C. Hansen, ed., 2000) (“there definitely should be a global patent system of some sort . . . I
think we can all list probable benefits of such a system: reduced costs for inventors and for
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And even if such a global patent system might solve the immediate problem posed by
this essay, there are many reasons to question whether such a system would be desirable more
generally. See John F. Duffy, Harmony and Diversity in Global Patent Law, 17 BERKELEY
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contractual arrangements between multinational firms solely on the basis of
patents asserted within their jurisdictions. As a result, evidence that jurisdictions
are developing positions favoring a given party in such disputes already exists.
This trend threatens a jurisdictional race to the bottom in their substantive and
procedural rules. Likewise, multinational litigants are adopting strategies
designed to bring suit in favorable jurisdictions as quickly as possible to achieve
“first strike” advantages. These unproductive litigation races distort the
processes and motivations behind judicial and administrative rulemaking —
substituting national desires to attract business for just and evenhanded
application of the law — and incentivize litigation when negotiation or
compromise might be more appropriate and efficient. Accordingly,
multijurisdictional solutions are needed to address these problems, whether they
arise through private ordering, international agreement or soft law mechanisms.

